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My doctoral research focuses on empirical investigations of contracting in inter-
mediate markets and its effects. I am currently pursuing two research projects that
together constitute the chapters of this dissertation. The first chapter focuses on con-
tracting between hospitals and insurers and a pricing practice in place in Maryland.
In the second chapter, which is joint work with Julie Holland Mortimer and Sylvia
Hristakeva, we instead investigate contracting practices in the national television ad-
vertising market.
Chapter 1. In recent years researchers and policymakers have shown renewed
interest in various types of health care reforms in the United States. In “Welfare
Effects of Using Hospital Rate Setting as an Alternative to Bargaining" with Ayse
Sera Diebel we investigate a potential health care reform. Prices paid by insurers to
hospitals are determined by bilateral negotiations in all U.S. states except Maryland,
where a unique all-payer rate setting health care regulation sets common prices for
all insurers. Theory models of bilateral bargaining are unable to assign welfare ef-
fects when contracts are unobserved. We empirically analyze how a Maryland style
regulation would affect overall welfare relative to bilateral bargaining, using the New
Jersey health care market as an example. Using hospital-, insurer-, and patient-level
data from 2010, we estimate a structural model of hospital and insurer demand, and
simulate consumer and insurer responses to the new price regime. We find that re-
placing bargaining with all-payer rate setting increases total surplus in the market.
However, not all agents benefit, and the effects depend on how the largest player in
our market, Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS), sets premiums. If BCBS sets premiums
à la Bertrand Nash, consumer surplus decreases, but joint hospital-insurer surplus in-
creases by more. The number of uninsured increases by two percent. Surplus changes
are robust to different pricing strategies of BCBS, that account for its non-profit sta-
tus but, diminish the magnitude of surplus changes.
Chapter 2. In “Contracts in the upfront market for national television advertis-
ing” with Sylvia Hristakeva and Julie Holland Mortimer, we investigate unique pricing
practices. We focus on advertising and treat it as an input to a firm’s production
process. The market of national television is of interest because it still commands the
majority of advertising in the United States. Yet, firms face different costs when ac-
cessing the market for national television ads. Industry practices suggest that (legacy)
firms with long histories of participation in the market benefit from favorable prices
to reach the same audiences. We confirm empirically whether there are important
differences in firms’ costs to advertise nationally. Contracts between advertisers and
networks are considered trade secrets, so we combine data on national ad placements
and program viewership demographics with average ad prices in each program airing
to perform our analysis. We find model-free evidence that firms who have longer re-
lationships with broadcasters face lower prices in those networks. We use a structural
model to quantify these price differentials, allowing for differences in firms’ payoffs
from advertising to different audiences. Preliminary results suggest that legacy firms
obtain an 8% discount relative to non-legacy firms. This discount translates into a
$2 million efficiency that would be available to a non-legacy firm if it were to merge
with a legacy firm.
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CHAPTER 1
WELFARE EFFECTS OF USING HOSPITAL RATE SETTING AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO BARGAINING (WITH AYSE SERA DIEBEL)
1 Introduction
Total expenditure on health care as a share of GDP increased from 5% in 1960 to
17.5% in 2014.1 Today, hospital costs represent almost one-third of total health care
expenditure, with high hospital prices and high hospital price growth being the main
drivers of the increasing health care expenditure.2,3 The increase in prices charged
by hospitals to insurers has prompted a growing empirical literature that focuses on
investigating the effect of hospital market power on negotiated prices. In 48 states
hospitals and insurers negotiate prices bilaterally, and this literature has taken the
bilateral bargaining in the market as given. An alternative model of hospital pricing
is an all-payer rate setting regulation (APRS), in which a state agency sets hospital
prices that are common to all insurers. The goal of this paper is to empirically an-
alyze the welfare effects of replacing bilateral bargaining in the health care market
with all-payer regulation.
While APRS regulations were historically used in many states, Maryland is the only
state that currently implements an APRS system.4 Compared to the rest of the
United States Maryland has below average premiums and above-average quality of
1Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), Office of the Actuary, National
Health Statistics Group.
2https : //www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf#094
3For a detailed breakdown of health expenditure growth in the past half century, see Catlin and
Cowan (2015).
4West Virginia also regulates hospital prices, but the state government does so by setting price
ceilings and price floors, and allowing hospitals to negotiate prices with insurers within these limits.
1
care. The success of the Maryland system and increasing policy interest in all-payer
systems by other states, such as Vermont which recently voted to implement an APRS
system5, makes it crucial to investigate the welfare effects of adopting all-payer rate
setting regulations.
We present a framework to analyze the effects of replacing bilateral bargaining with
a Maryland-style all-payer regulation and investigate the effects of implementing a
Maryland-style all-payer system in New Jersey.6 We begin by estimating consumer
demand for hospitals using detailed individual discharge data. Once we have hospi-
tal demand estimates, we calculate the expected utility from an insurer’s network of
hospitals. This first measure of expected utility is used to account for the fact that
insurers only contract with a subset of hospitals in their market. We then estimate
consumers’ demand for insurance, including expected utility as an insurer character-
istic. Given demand estimates and hospital price estimates from a Maryland-style
pricing rule, we allow insurers to re-optimize their premiums and networks of hospital.
We find that if New Jersey were to switch to a Maryland style APRS regulation, it
would gain more than 2.2 billion dollars in producer surplus, where producer surplus
is the combined surplus of hospitals and insurers.7 The monetary value of the loss
in consumer welfare would be about 700 dollars per consumer, or a loss of 1.7 billion
dollars at the state level. This constitutes a gain of over 500 million dollars in total
surplus. Along with these surplus changes, we see a 2.5% increase in the number of
uninsured.
Our consumer surplus results suggest that when prices are negotiated through bilat-
eral bargaining, BCBS leverages its market power to obtain lower prices from hospitals
which are then passed on to consumers in the form of lower premiums. The lower
5Vermont obtained a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) waiver for its all-payer
regulation for 2017-2022
6New Jersey was chosen due to data availability of insurer hospital networks. Patient character-
istics and hospital characteristics are not significantly different between the two states which also
face similar costs of capital and labor.
7We do not observe prices charged between hospital-insurer pairs in New Jersey before regulation,
so we cannot decompose producer surplus further.
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premiums of BCBS help it maintain its high market share and leverage in future
price negotiations with insurers. This type of behavior by firms in the presence of
bargaining reflects the idea of countervailing market power, first introduced by Gal-
braith (1952). Countervailing market power can be summarized as the ability of large
downstream buyers (insurers) to extract price concessions from upstream suppliers
(hospitals) which are then passed on to consumers. Hence, APRS could have a draw-
back. All-payer rate setting prices might limit markups less than insurers do when
firms are allowed to exercise their market power through bargaining.
Surplus for consumers can be broken down further into three groups of consumers:
(i) those that stay with BCBS after a premium increase (ii) those that leave BCBS to
another insurer (iii) those that stay with an insurer other than BCBS. Type (i) con-
sumers lose a significant amount of surplus when BCBS’s premiums increase. Type
(ii) consumers also lose surplus because they face a higher premium from their new
insurer (about $30 a month more than what consumers were previously paying to
BCBS) and a more restrictive network. Type (iii) consumers see a significant gain in
surplus, as the non BCBS plans are able to lower premiums by more than enough to
offset the loss from changes to their hospital networks.
The main driver of changes in surplus is BCBS.8 With this in mind, we examine
two other counterfactuals based on BCBS’s pricing strategy. Our second countrefac-
tual has BCBS optimize a weighted sum of profits and consumer surplus. BCBS is
a non-profit firm and may care about consumer welfare and profits jointly.9 Under
this maximization assumption the direction of change in producer, consumer, total
surplus and number of uninsured are all the same, however, the magnitude of each
surplus change is smaller. It is only in our third counterfactual, which does not allow
BCBS to change its premiums at all, that we see gains in producer and consumer
surplus simultaneously. 10 We also see the number of uninsured decrease by 1.46%.
8BCBS is the largest private insurer in New Jersey with a 66% market share, and the United
States with almost a 40% share of the market.
9Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006) have a good discussion of different pricing strategies and pos-
sible advantages of non-profit firms.
10This third counterfactual mimics a recent attempt in New Jersey to force BCBS to be a provider
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The literature on bilateral bargaining provides evidence of many market features
which prevent firms from obtaining monopoly surplus. In particular, O’Brien and
Shaffer (1992), Rey and Stiglitz (1988), and Rey and Tirole (1986) have each shown,
respectively, that joint profit is not maximized if any of the following apply to the
market: contracts are unobserved, there exist multiple upstream firms, or there is
demand and cost uncertainty.11 As there is reason to believe that these conditions all
apply to the health care market, it is impossible to predict the effect that bilateral
bargaining has on the joint surplus of hospitals and insurers and thus impossible to
predict the effects of replacing bargaining with APRS. We find that bargaining is
detrimental to the joint surplus of hospitals and insurers compared to Maryland-style
all-payer rate setting. To further analyze the changes in producer surplus we break it
into two broad categories, surplus from BCBS and its hospital network and surplus
from other insurers and their networks. BCBS gains in surplus come from an increase
in its premiums which dominate the loss in market share from those higher premi-
ums. BCBS increases its premiums in order to offset the higher prices it likely now
must pay to hospitals and because its market share is no longer effective in obtaining
discounts from hospitals. Other insurers gains come from stealing market share from
BCBS, the extra revenue generated from new consumers offsets the lower premiums
charged to consumers who did not switch their insurance. The other insurers also
switch to lower cost hospitals increasing total producer surplus.
There is a growing literature on the formation of insurer-provider networks. Ho
(2006) investigates the welfare impacts of restricted network formation and finds that
consumer welfare would increase if health plans included all the hospitals in their
of last resort.
11Even the simple case of a monopoly supplier with unobservable contracts can reduce total
surplus below that of monopoly. Once contracts have been established, even if those contracts
achieve monopoly profits or the vertically integrated profits, a hospital and insurer can increase
their bilateral profits by privately negotiating a reduction in their marginal transfer price which in
turn lowers the retail price and shifts customers and profits away from rivals. The welfare effects of
the renegotiation depend upon competition in the insurer market. See Dobson and Waterson (1997),
von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Chen (2003).
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networks keeping prices and premiums fixed. While her conclusion is intuitive, it
does not allow health plans to change premiums when they widen their networks.
Ericson and Starc (2015) find that individuals’ preference towards network breadth
gets stronger with age. Shepard (2016a) looks at the effect adverse selection has on
insurers’ decisions to include a ’star’ hospital in their network. He finds adverse se-
lection provides a strong incentive to exclude a ’star’ hospital but does not improve
welfare. To our knowledge, there is no other work in the empirical literature that
allows insurers to re-optimize their networks under a different price regime and set
their premiums accordingly. In this paper, we follow this methodology to obtain the
impacts of a counterfactual change in the price regime to an APRS system.
Our work is also related to the strand of literature that seeks to explicitly model
the price negotiations between insurers and providers, normally in a Nash Bargain-
ing framework.12 These studies aim to uncover how surplus in the market is split
between insurers and hospitals depending on their market power or leverage in the
negotiation process. They find that hospitals in systems are able to set higher prices
and extract a larger share of the market’s surplus. More recent papers (Liebman
(2016) and Ghili (2016)) were able to show the threat of exclusion to be important
in determining price. Most papers that focus on bargaining rely upon at least one of
the three following assumptions: (i) hospitals negotiate as systems and not individual
entities; (ii) the hospital networks of insurers remain unchanged ; (iii) premiums are
fixed. While these are necessary assumptions for computational reasons, we are not as
restricted in our counterfactual analysis, because prices are the same for all insurers.
This grants us greater flexibility in modeling insurer choices over individual hospitals
and allowing insurer networks to change. We still must make a restriction in our
equilibrium search where we fix the size of insurer networks. Thus we contribute to
the literature analyzing bargaining and optimal decision making by focusing on total
surplus changes due to the removal of bargaining.
12For recent papers that investigate price negotiation in the health care context, see Brooks et al.
(1997), Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), Lewis and Pflum (2015), HaasWilson and Garmon (2011) ,
Dafny et al. (2016), Ho and Lee (2017) and Prager (2016).
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature
and a brief history of rate setting in the United States. Section 3 discusses the data.
Section 4 outlines the model used in estimation. Section 5 reports the estimation
results. Section 6 provides welfare analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Industry Background and Literature
Our paper is the first to empirically assess the effects of an all-payer system on wel-
fare in the United States health care market.13 Thus our paper is rooted in the
literature that investigates government regulation in the hospital industry.14 Pre-
vious literature on hospital rate setting analyzed its impact on growth of hospital
costs, mostly in a linear regression context. Findings indicate that rate setting led
to a decline in hospital cost growth in states where the regulation had been imple-
mented for three or more years.15 The findings of Dranove and Cone (1985) indicate
that states with hospital rate setting experienced 1.32 percent smaller increases in
expenses per admission. Melnick et al. (1981) conclude rate regulation lowers aver-
age and total hospital expenses. Thorpe and Phelps (1990) use data from New York
State’s all-payer system and find an annual growth of 1.9 percent in hospital costs
when the price constraint is binding as opposed to a growth of 5.5 percent when it is
not binding. Different from these previous studies, we investigate rate settings effects
on consumer welfare and producer surplus which was not addressed by past authors16.
Imposing Maryland APRS removes the price competition among hospitals, thus our
work is related to the literature on hospital competition. While most theoretical re-
13Pauly and Town (2012) summarize past arguments for and against Maryland’s APRS there has
been no empirical work investigating possible reactions of the market.
14This literature focused on three major forms of regulation: utilization review, certificate-of-need,
and rate setting. For a detailed review of empirical findings in each, see Salkever (2000).
15Joskow (1981), Eby and Cohodes (1985), and Salkever (2000) summarize these findings.
16We assume authors were unable to quantify welfare due to computational restrictions of the
time.
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sults on competition and quality with variable prices are ambiguous, the theoretical
literature on competition and quality when prices are regulated is clear. Gaynor et al.
(2007) finds when price is above marginal cost, competition leads to more quality and
improves consumer welfare but may have any impact on social welfare. Propper et al.
(2004) support this theory with empirical findings showing that when the National
Health Service of the United Kingdom removed price regulation and encouraged hos-
pital competition, hospital quality decreased. Morrisey et al. (1983) and Garber and
Phelps (1997) both present a theoretical framework under which rate review can be
analyzed. These models see rate setting as a ceiling on the value of the service bun-
dle produced by the hospital. If a binding ceiling is imposed, these models predict
a reduction in quality while the impact on quantity is ambiguous. We refrain from
the analysis of quality of care as the rate setting agencies also regulate hospital qual-
ity. Furthermore, there is little evidence in the empirical literature that DRG-based
(Diagnosis-Related Group) payment systems such as APRS and prospective payment
systems (PPS) reduce the quality of care.17 We assume that hospital quality remains
unchanged among the privately insured patients and investigate the change of price
and network structure alone.
APRS also removes price discrimination between hospitals and insurers, thus we con-
nect with the empirical literature that investigates price discrimination and vertical
relationships. While this literature is large (Brenkers and Verboven (2006), Gold-
berg and Verboven (2001), Hellerstein (2008), Sudhir (2001), Mortimer (2008a), and
Villas-Boas (2009)), our paper is most related to Grennan (2013). He investigates the
effects of a shift to uniform pricing of medical devices and finds uniform prices work
against hospitals and for medical device producers by softening competition. He is
able to model optimal pricing of medical devices producers as he observes granular
price data. We have no price data from New Jersey but do have hospital costs and
thus can still comment on overall producer surplus, or the combination of hospital
and insurer surplus, but are not able to make comments on individual hospital or
17See, for example, Kahn et al. (1990), Hadley (1995), Rosko (1990).
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insurer profits.
2.1 A Brief History of Regulation and Competition in Health Care Mar-
kets
Federal and state governments in the United States tried both free markets and reg-
ulation as means to contain costs in response to constantly increasing national health
care expenditure. While specific programs had different impacts on health care costs,
neither approach consistently led to a substantial decrease in overall expenditure.
Altman and Rodwin (1988) summarize the strategies to contain health care spending
both by competition and by regulation. On the competition frontier, increasing con-
sumer co-payments and deductibles were used to offset moral hazard, HMO competi-
tion, and prudent purchaser programs where large insurance plans received discounts
from providers in return for a greater volume of patients were also used. Authors
conclude that while competition may increase efficiency, it does not substantially re-
duce health care spending. On the regulatory frontier, federal and state governments
pursued certificate-of-need programs, increase in quality and safety standards, hospi-
tal rate-setting, and prospective payment systems (PPS). Among these, hospital rate
setting and PPS proved to be effective in cutting costs.18 19 The power of PPS to
cut costs is encouraging for our analysis as PPS and Maryland APRS are similar in
that price per admission to a hospital for a specific DRG is fixed.
Competition, both in the hospital market and in the health plan market, is expected
to drive hospital costs down. High concentration of hospitals in the market encour-
ages hospitals to cut costs as they compete on a price basis to be included in health
18PPS and state rate setting are similar in nature as they are both prospective payment systems
that limit revenues and charges based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Eby and Cohodes (1985),
Friedman and Coffey (1993), Sloan (1983a) all emphasize the relative success of mandatory rate
setting in the context of cost containment.
19See citehadley1995hospital.
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plan networks.20 Competition among health plans is also expected to restrain hospi-
tal costs and control the quantity of the services provided.21 Since health plans have
large patient populations in geographically concentrated areas, they are expected to
have leverage in negotiations and drive the hospital prices down. Their incentive to
oversee the quantity and quality of services provided will prevent overuse and ensure
patients get the exact care they need. However, hospital mergers, formation of hos-
pital systems, and integration of hospital and physician groups led to an increased
market power of particular provider groups that increased health care prices.22 Our
paper finds evidence that bargaining between insurers and hospitals does successfully
lower costs for the consumer but at the expense of producer and total market surplus.
The effects of regulation, specifically hospital rate setting are discussed next.
2.2 Hospital Rate Setting
Starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, state governments began to implement
mandatory rate setting programs where hospital rates or budgets were regulated.
The purpose of hospital rate setting was to control hospital cost growth while reduc-
ing price discrimination and deterring cost shifting. More than half of the U.S. states
adopted such programs on either mandatory or voluntary basis, and regulated the
price paid to hospitals by insurers (payers) at the state level. The first mandatory
hospital rate setting at the state level was implemented in 1971.23 Implementation of
mandatory compliance varied from state to state in terms of payers covered, frequency
and nature of adjustments, the administrative bodies responsible for the regulation,
20Feldman et al. (1990) show that HMOs’ price elasticity of demand for hospitals is very high.
21See Hadley (1995).
22See Ho (2009) among others.
23The first state to adopt a mandatory hospital rate setting was New York State. In the following
years, six more states also adopted this mandatory regulatory approach and rate setting commissions
were established in Massachusetts (1975), New Jersey (1974), Maryland (1974), Washington (1975),
Connecticut (1976), Maine (1983), Wisconsin (1983), West Virginia (1983). For the history and
evolution of hospital rate setting system in the United States and particularly in Maryland, see
Murray and Berenson (2015) and Murray (2009). Sloan (1981) and Sloan (1983b) also present the
general framework for voluntary and mandatory prospective reimbursement programs and outline
the early literature.
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unit of payment (per diem, per case etc.), and methods for establishing rates (formula,
budget review etc.).24 Yet, all the mandatory rate setting programs were similar in
their fundamental elements. All statewide prospective reimbursement programs had
external authorities that set or approve hospital charges. The price paid by payers
to hospitals per unit of service was determined on a base year and the rates in the
following years were trended forward based on the base year rate, independent of
actual costs of the hospital. These restricted rates created incentives for hospitals to
decrease operating costs for a given service as this resulted in higher profits. More-
over, the pre-determined rate charged by a hospital was allowed to vary across payers
and services.
A common critique of rate setting is that regulated hospitals’ revenues may not meet
expenses and they would be forced to use capital reserves to manage shortfalls. How-
ever, the study by Schramm et al. (1986) shows that regulated hospitals improved
their operating margins by reducing expenses along with revenues. Furthermore,
their financial positions were not affected by unexpected expenses such as uncompen-
sated care as rate setting programs spread these costs equitably among all hospitals.
Hospitals in these states did not need to spend from their capital reserves to cover
operating expenses. Moreover, with rate setting, they managed to obtain operating
surpluses that became a source of accumulated capital.
Maryland’s hospital rate setting program is the only remaining APRS system today.
It is considered to be the most stable and most successful mandatory hospital rate
setting program in the U.S. When the program was established, the cost of admission
to a hospital was about 25 percent above the U.S. average while in 1993 this cost was
11 percent below the nation average. The rates in Maryland are determined by an
independent state agency, the Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC), in
co-operation with the hospitals. By implementing an all-payer system in Maryland,
24See Sloan (1981) andSloan (1983b).
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HSCRC aimed to25 constrain hospital cost growth, increase the equity and the fair-
ness of the payment system, ensure that hospitals have the financial ability to provide
efficient and high quality care to all Maryland citizens regardless of their ability to
pay, improve access to hospital care by financing uncompensated care, and to make
all parties accountable to the public. HSCRC was also the first to negotiate a waiver
from Medicare and to set Medicare rates for each hospital within the state.26
2.3 Reduced-Form Evidence on Hospital Rate Setting
Most of the work in the reduced-form literature concluded mandatory hospital rate
setting programs lowered hospital expenses, both on average and at the state level.27
These early papers that regress change in hospital expenses on a regulation dummy
are usually criticized in several aspects.28 First, the dummy coefficient may suffer from
aggregation bias as regulation intensity varies across states. Second, these settings
assume that the implementation of the regulation is exogenous and does not depend
on the economic conditions in the states’ health markets. The inclination of states
with higher hospital costs to implement regulatory policies introduces bias in these
estimates and creates a self-selection problem. Third, the effect that is attributed to
rate setting might exaggerate its true impact as federal and state governments imple-
mented other regulatory programs to reduce hospital costs during the same period.
Several papers in the literature addressed these issues.
Morrisey et al. (1983) compares effectiveness of rate setting programs across states
and finds New York and Massachusetts were the most successful in lowering costs.
Their results were challenged by Dranove and Cone (1985). They argue that the
regression to the mean approach will overstate the effectiveness if the states that
25The goals of HSCRC can be found on their website: http://www.hscrc.state.md.us
26A detailed explanation of the state legislation and its evolution throughout the years can be
found in Murray and Berenson (2015).
27Biles et al. (1980), Melnick et al. (1981), Sloan (1983b) support the on average effect while
findings of Morrisey et al. (1983) show that expenses go down at the state level using several measures
(expenses per patient day, per admission, per capita).
28See, for example, Maddala (1986).
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implement rate setting programs are the ones with transitory higher costs to begin
with. To address this issue, they directly include the omitted variable in their regres-
sions. Their findings indicate that while MA, NY, and MD have implemented such
programs in response to high costs, this is not the case with WA and NJ. Therefore,
regression to the mean does not greatly bias the result on the average effectiveness of
the rate setting programs, however individual state results reported by Morrisey et al.
(1983) are skewed. Antel et al. (1995) include state fixed effects in their regressions
to control for potentially endogenous timing of the regulations. They use longitudinal
data to investigate the effects of different regulatory program intensities29 on hospital
costs. Their results indicate that no regulatory program lowered hospital costs on its
own, however rate setting attenuated the cost increase due to Medicare.
Schramm et al. (1986) compared six rate setting states to the rest of the nation and
found that cost per admission to the hospital increased 87 percent more in unregu-
lated states compared to regulated states. Thorpe and Phelps (1990) analyzed the
effect of rate-setting program in New York on inpatient cost per admission and found
that costs in hospitals which received payments below average costs grew by 1.94 per-
cent compared to the 5.5 percent cost increase in their counterparts who retrieve the
average costs. Their analysis imply that the degree of regulatory intensity, measured
in terms of hospital-specific disallowances and how rarely the base year is adjusted,
play an important role in cost containment. Atkinson (2009) also found that costs go
up less than the national average when states regulate hospital prices. Robinson and
Luft (1985) compared hospital cost growth in unregulated states, four rate setting
states (MA, MD, NJ, NY), and California during 1982-1986. Over this period, hos-
pital competition in California was triggered by the changes of a state law.30 Their
results show that the hospital cost growth in MA, MD, and NY was significantly
lower than the unregulated states while the results for NJ were insignificant. They
29They investigate the effects of price controls such as rate setting, ESP, and PPS as well as
investment and procedure controls such as certificate-of-need programs, utilization review.
30The changes made in 1982 increased growth of PPOs and granted permission to selective contract
negotiations between third-parties, Medicaid and PPOs, and hospitals. See Hadley (1995)
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further find that for highly competitive markets, rate setting succeeds just as much
as competition does in cutting costs; while rate setting proves to be more effective in
slowing down cost growth in markets with less hospital competition.
Several papers investigate the non-cost impacts of rate setting find mixed evidence.
Sloan (1981) finds increase in revenue to expense ratio for mature programs while
Sloan (1983b) finds no impact on hospital profits. Morrisey et al. (1983) find the
negative impact on revenues is smaller than negative impact on expenses, therefore
hospitals’ profit margins were slightly improved by rate setting. Decline in prices with
rate setting and the spread of health insurance was expected to increase utilization
of hospital services. Joskow (1981) and Worthington and Piro (1982) find increase in
occupancy rates and length of stay for some rate setting states but negligible influence
on admission per capita population overall. Melnick et al. (1981) find decrease in the
rate of decrease in the average length of stay with the implementation of rate setting
programs, while number of admissions do not change. Findings of Sloan (1981, 1983)
indicate that rate setting did not change the growth rate of admissions, patient days,
outpatient visits or average length of stay. Schramm et al. (1986) also find admissions
and length of stay did not change in rate setting states as rate setting agencies and
PSROs controlled hospital utilization. Lastly, a few papers investigated the impact
of rate setting on the services offered. Joskow (1981) finds no change in the number
of CT scanners in the state. Cromwell and Kanak (1982) find mostly no change in
the services and facilities offered by hospitals, while the impact on different services
varied across rate setting programs.
There are two major conclusions of this literature. First, mature mandatory rate-
setting programs led to a reduction in hospital cost growth.31 Second, state level
mandatory rate setting have been more effective than other regulatory programs both
31These programs are observed to be ineffective for three years following their implementation,
although this threshold is not methodologically explained in the literature. The most common
explanations are learning by doing and confounding influences of ESP. See, for example, Eby and
Cohodes (1985), Morrisey et al. (1983) Sloan (1983b).
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in cost and non-cost aspects.32 Morrisey et al. (1983) make the “educated guess" that
rate setting programs will succeed in achieving its goals in states with similar political
and regulatory environments.
3 Data
This paper utilizes data from various sources. Hospital characteristics come from the
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals 2011. Consumer
characteristics and discharge reports come from State Inpatient Databases (SID) 2010
provided through the Health Care Utilization Project (HCUP). Insurer characteris-
tics come from Atlantic Information Services (AIS) with premium and enrollment
data being supplemented by the WEISS Ratings Guide. Insurer characteristics from
AIS include enrollment and number of enrolled by sector (commercial risk, public
risk etc.). WEISS provides investment ratings of insurers, enrollment and premiums.
Additional plan characteristics are taken from National Committee for Quality As-
surance (NCQA) Report on Health Plan Rankings. These characteristics include the
type of the insurance plan (HMO, PPO etc.), states served, an overall quality score
as well as measures of consumer satisfaction, prevention, and treatment. We also use
2010 U.S. Census data on population (by age and sex) and number of uninsured by
state to supplement our dataset.
We use SID data from New Jersey it covers 73 hospitals and 230,268 discharges in
total. The patient zip code, diagnosis, treatment, insurance, age, sex, and charges
are provided. We aggregate diagnosis to the 25 Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs)
as defined by the Centers for Medicare Services. All emergency room admissions are
dropped as it is not likely these patients have any choice over the hospital to which
they are admitted. This data is summarized in Table 1. We observe patients’ zip
codes and the hospitals they visited, therefore we are able to calculate the distance
between a patient’s residence location and hospital location. Average patient in our
32See Morrisey et al. (1983) for a list of the papers that reach this conclusion.
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data travels 10 miles to get care at a hospital. Females constitute 66.4% of all dis-
charges due to the large number of pregnancies and childbirths. This paper focuses
only on the non-elderly population (ages between 0 and 64) as people above 65 are
likely to be enrolled in Medicare plans and we are concerned with private health plans
only. Since all new-borns are considered as new patients in this dataset, the average
patient is younger than expected.
Table 1.1: Patient Characteristics
Mean SD Min Max
Distance (miles) 10.017 6.909 0.165 198.972
Female 0.664 0.472 0 1
Age 26.166 21.535 0 64
Notes: N = 230,268 discharges.
Table 2 provides a summary of select variables from the hospital dataset.33 We re-
port information on 131 hospitals that operate Maryland and New Jersey. We observe
ownership type (profit, non-profit), teaching status, system membership, total inpa-
tient days, total number of admissions and services offered by each hospital among
other variables.
The health plan dataset is at the national level and is constructed using various
sources. The first four variables summarized in Table 3 come from AIS and Weiss
Ratings Guide. To calculate premiums, we divided total premium revenue reported
by each plan by the number of enrollees. Average premium per patient per month
ranges from $66.7 to $1075.6 with an average of $384.6. The range is large since all
types of plans (low-premium HMOs, high-premium indemnity plans etc.) are present
in the dataset. In addition to premiums, we observe the age of the plan, the number
of physicians who participated in the insurer’s network of providers, and the total
number of enrollees. The rest of the variables are created using NCQA reports on
plan performance. This source reports type of each plan, which we aggregate to two
33Full list of hospital characteristics used in the analysis can be found in Table A1.
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Table 1.2: Hospital Characteristics
MD NJ
Mean SD Mean SD
Patient Days 67400.776 51340.834 82038.411 54282.317
Admissions 12417.672 10243.425 13605.137 11459.288
Beds 247.414 178.628 303.425 172.988
Teaching 0.138 0.348 0.151 0.360
Full Time Physicians 42.810 107.461 28.370 56.432
Full Time Nurses 325.776 366.470 347.000 307.057
Colonoscopy 0.621 0.489 0.603 0.493
Endoscopic Ultrasound 0.466 0.503 0.507 0.503
Ablation of Esophagus 0.276 0.451 0.411 0.495
Fertility Clinic 0.103 0.307 0.096 0.296
Hemodialysis 0.569 0.500 0.616 0.490
General 0.793 0.409 0.795 0.407
Obstetrics 0.603 0.493 0.616 0.490
Cardiac Intensive Care 0.379 0.489 0.493 0.503
Neonatal Intensive Care 0.293 0.459 0.315 0.468
Burn Care 0.034 0.184 0.055 0.229
Birthing Room 0.569 0.500 0.630 0.486
Blood Donor 0.207 0.409 0.137 0.346
Mammogram 0.707 0.459 0.712 0.456
Cardiac Cathederization 0.483 0.504 0.521 0.503
Cardiac Surgery 0.172 0.381 0.233 0.426
Chemotherapy 0.741 0.442 0.740 0.442
AIDS 0.431 0.500 0.507 0.503
Neurology 0.759 0.432 0.781 0.417
Oncology 0.724 0.451 0.740 0.442
Orthopedic 0.810 0.395 0.753 0.434
Diagnostic Radioisotope 0.707 0.459 0.726 0.449
Full Field Digital Mammography 0.362 0.485 0.562 0.500
Magnetic Resonance Imaging 0.655 0.479 0.726 0.449
Multislice Spiral Computed Tomography 0.707 0.459 0.699 0.462
Positron Emission Tomography 0.190 0.395 0.384 0.490
Ultrasound 0.810 0.395 0.795 0.407
Heart Transplant 0.034 0.184 0.027 0.164
Kidney Transplant 0.034 0.184 0.068 0.254
Tissue Transplant 0.086 0.283 0.055 0.229
Virtual Colonoscopy 0.241 0.432 0.151 0.360
Woman’s Health Center 0.603 0.493 0.685 0.468
Number Hospitals 58 73
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categories: HMO/POS and PPO/Indemnity. In our data, 43.4% of the plans are
PPO/Indemnity. NCQA also reports a score that takes into account NCQA Accred-
itation standards, member satisfaction and clinical measures. While the maximum
score possible is 100, the highest score we observe for a health plan is 90.5. Lastly,
we use three measures of plan performance: consumer satisfaction, treatment, and
prevention that range between 1 (lowest performance level) and 5 (highest perfor-
mance level). For a detailed explanation of construction of these measures, see the
data appendix.
Table 1.3: Health Plan Characteristics
Mean SD Min Max
Premiums 384.61 146.36 66.67 1,075.64
Age 29.896 15.821 1 78
Physicians 23,851.9 19,368.7 281 140,997
Total Enrollment 255,367.4 427,369.3 1,000 3,942,500
PPO/Indemnity 0.433 0.50 0 1
Consumer Satisfaction 2.9 1.02 1 5
Treatment 3 1.08 1 5
Prevention 2.9 1.08 1 5
Score 79.57 6.41 58.4 90.5
Notes: N = 473 health plans.
4 Model and Methodology
The methodology will consist of two main stages: First, we estimate the consumers’
demand for hospitals which is used to calculate the value of an insurer’s network of
hospitals which in turn is used as an insurer characteristic in estimation of insurer
demand. Expected hospital demand is also used in tandem with predicted prices
hospitals in New Jersey would charge under APRS to calculate costs associated with
an insurer’s hospital network. With estimates of consumer demand for health plans
and insurer’s expected costs we than allow insurers to optimize over premiums and
hospital networks and calculate the producer surplus (for hospitals and insurers) and
consumer surplus in New Jersey under the new price regime.
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4.1 Estimation of the Demand Side
The estimation of the demand side is done in three steps following Capps et al. (2003)
and Ho (2006). First, we estimate the demand of consumers for hospitals using a con-
ditional logit model.34 Next, we use the estimated parameters from this first step to
calculate the expected utilities from a network of hospitals for consumers. Finally,
we use these expected utility measures as an input while estimating the demand for
health plans using the Berry et al. (1995) (henceforth BLP) approach.
Hospital Demand:
Let the utility of patient i from visiting hospital h given diagnosis l in market m be:
uihlm = u(xhm, vilm|λ, θ) (1.1)
where xh is a vector of observed hospital characteristics, vil is a vector of observed
consumer characteristics such as location, age and diagnosis and (λ, θ) are parameters
to be estimated. Patients choose hospitals to maximize utility, so if patient i with
diagnosis l chooses hospital h, then the following inequality must hold for all other
hospitals h′ in the market, where the market subscript m will be suppressed for
notational ease:
uihl = u(xh, vil|λ, θ) ≥ uih′l = u(xh′ , vil|λ, θ) (1.2)
In particular, let the specification for the utility be:
uihl = θxh + λxhvil + εihl (1.3)
where the independently and identically distributed error term εihl captures idiosyn-
cratic tastes and is assumed to have a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. Then, the
hospital share equation can be written as:







where Hj is the set of hospitals in insurer j′s hospital network.
Since we observe the actual shares, we use maximum likelihood to obtain the pa-
rameter estimates λ̂ and θ̂. Unlike our health plan demand model, this model does
not account for unobserved characteristics or unobserved quality of hospitals.35 We
have very rich hospital characteristics data, therefore we assume that the 83 charac-
teristics we use in estimation capture the quality of hospitals. Identification in this
model comes from the variation in patients’ hospital choice sets across insurers. In
our model, patients’ choice sets are defined by the set of hospitals in an insurer’s
hospital network. Results of this estimation are presented in Table 4.
Expected Utility:
Given the parameter estimates from the above estimation we can calculate the pre-
dicted utility of each individual of type i where types are defined by age-sex-zip code
cells:36
ˆuihl = θ̂xh + λ̂xhvil + εihl (1.5)
Then, we calculate expected utility for patient type i from each plan j’s hospital
networks. Ben-Akiva (1973) shows that, under the assumptions of Type 1 extreme









where pil is the probability that patient type i is hospitalized with diagnosis l and Hj
35An ideal way to account for unobserved hospital characteristics would be to do the logit esti-
mation using hospital fixed effects in the first stage and regress the estimates of the hospital-specific
term on observed hospital characteristics in the second stage, as in Ho (2006). However, we are
limited by a single years worth of data. Therefore, we collapsed the two-stage process into one
estimating equation.
36Age groups are defined as 0-17,18-34,35-44,45-54,55-64
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is the set of hospitals in insurer plan j.
We only observe insurer networks in New Jersey and Maryland and thus must com-
pute networks for insurers of other states. We collected hospital networks of insurers
from their websites in 2017 for 16 states37 and use those networks to calculate ex-
pected utility for insurers other than Maryland and New Jersey. For the states where
we don’t observe exact insurer networks, we use the number of hospitals insurers con-
tract with and calculate the average expected utility from a hospital network of that
size taking into account the number of reported insurer contracts hospitals report.
The average is calculated at the level of the individual of type i.
Health Plan Demand:
As expected utility is not perfectly observed, for robustness we begin with a con-
ditional logit model that accounts for unobserved characteristics of a plan without
expected utility and then also run the same conditional logit model for Maryland
and New Jersey, as these are the two states we observe hospital networks. Our third
specification, uses the imputed expected utility for the single most populated zip code
in combination with random coefficients to estimate a BLP style model. Finally our
preferred demand specification uses expected utility at at the age-sex-zip code level
as well as median income at the zip code level. We have 50 markets in total and
observe 473 commercial health plans that operate in these markets. Results from the
health plan demand estimation are presented in Table 5.
Conditional Logit:
The logit framework used to estimate health plan demand closely follows the specifi-
cation in Berry (1994). Let utility individual i gets from plan j in market r be:
37The states for which he have network data are Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Delaware, Rhode Island, New York, Florida, Washington, Kentucky, Colorado, Maryland, New





xjkrβk + ξjr + εijr (1.7)
where xjkr is the kth observed plan characteristic of plan j and ξj represents the unob-
served plan characteristic (such as patients’ perception about quality, status, service,
reputation, past experience etc.). For simplicity, we drop the market subscripts in




xjkβk + ξj + εij = δj(xj, ξj, β) + εij (1.8)
where δj represents the mean utility level from plan j. The unobserved characteristics
are assumed to be mean independent of xj’s and also independent across markets.
The error term εij is independently and identically distributed across consumers and
plans and has a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution. Normalizing the mean utility
from the outside good to be zero (i.e. δo = 0), the closed-form solution for the market

















Dividing equation (7) by equation (8) gives:
sj
so
= eδj =⇒ ln(sj)− ln(so) = δj (1.11)
Hence, we generate δ’s using the market share data. Having obtained the dependent
21




xjkβk + ξj (1.12)
Before moving on with the estimation, the endogeneity problem caused by the premi-
ums needs to be addressed. The unobserved plan characteristic ξj (the error term in
equation (10)) is likely to be correlated with the plan’s premium which is one of the
observable plan characteristics. One would expect a high-quality, better-service plan
to charge a higher premium. For this reason, we instrument for the premium vari-
able. Traditional instruments used in the literature for price are cost shifters (these
are difficult to find as they are usually correlated with ξ’s), characteristics of com-
peting products in the same market, and prices of the same product in other markets
(because a shock to marginal cost will be carried to prices in other markets). We
use the characteristics of other plans within the same market as instruments. These
instruments and the relevant validity tests are further discussed in section 5. Given
these instruments Z, we form the moment conditions as follows. First, we calculate
the unobserved quality term ξj as a function of model parameters:
ξj = δj −
∑
k




The instruments should be orthogonal to this unobserved quality term, so we form
the moment conditions as E[ξ(β)′Z] = 0. In applying iterative GMM, we use the “op-
timal" weighting matrix W which is the inverse of the variance of moment conditions.
Therefore, the problem reduces to:
min
β
ξ(β)′ZWZ ′ξ(β) where W = (E[Z ′ξξ′Z])−1 (1.14)
The analytical solution to this problem is:
β = (X ′ZWZ ′X)−1(X ′ZWZ ′δ) (1.15)
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The iterative estimation algorithm starts withW = (Z ′Z)−1 to get an initial estimate
β̂, and then we re-compute W = (E[Z ′ξ(β̂)ξ(β̂)′Z])−1 to get a new estimate of β.
Identification in this model comes from the variation in consumers’ choice sets across
markets as well as the variation of health plan characteristics within a market.
BLP (1995) and Ho (2006):
The major drawback of the previous model is that it does not generate realistic substi-
tution patterns. In this setting, cross-price elasticities between any two plans depends
only on their market shares. Consider two health plans A and B whose market shares
are the same. Let A be an HMO plan with low premiums, narrow hospital and
physician network and low rating and B be a PPO plan with high premium, large
provider network and top rating. Assume there is another PPO plan C in the market
with high premiums, large provider network and high quality rating. The cross-price
elasticity of the previous model implies that if plan C increases its premiums, the
demand for plan A and plan B will increase equally. This is unintuitive as we expect
the cross-price effect to be larger for health plans that are similar in characteristics.
The model presented by BLP (1995) solves this problem and generates realistic sub-
stitution patterns. With the BLP estimation outline below, cross-price elasticities are
larger for products that are closer together in terms of their characteristics.
Let the utility of patient i from plan j be:




where ξjm are unobserved plan characteristics, zjm are the observed plan characteris-
tics, and premjm is plan jm’s premium, yi is the median income by zipcode, EUijm
is the expected utility per age-sex-zipcode cell and ηij are idiosyncratic shocks to
consumer tastes that are assumed to be i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value. It is the pres-
ence of the yi and EUijm that allows us to capture the heterogeneity of preferences
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in a more flexible way. In this setting, consumers with similar characteristics prefer
similar products. Therefore, if a plan is removed from the choice set, consumers will
substitute to other plans that are similar in terms of characteristics and this generates
more realistic substitution patterns.
Identification in this model comes from the variation in patients’ plan choice sets
across markets. To address the endogeneity issue, we again instrument for premiums
using the BLP-type instruments mentioned above. The outside good is defined as
having no insurance and its share is calculated using the Census data. In this setting,
share of plan j cannot be solved analytically. While BLP (1995) uses simulation,







sijm(β, λ, γ) (1.17)
Where ni is the number of individuals in consumer type i, nm is the number in the
market, and sijm the share of type i individuals choosing plan j in market m, is
defined by
ˆsijm(λ, γ, β) =
exp





ξkm + β1premkm + zkmβ + γ1EUikm(Hkm) + γ2 premkmyi

(1.18)
Given the equation for predicted shares, we use the contraction mapping algorithm
suggested by BLP (1995) to obtain δ, the mean utility level vector. This algorithm
aims to match the predicted shares ŝ to the observed true shares s using the following
equation:
δh = δh−1 + ln(s)− ln(ŝ) (1.19)
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We begin by evaluating the right-hand side at an initial guess of parameters and δ,
obtain a new δ, put it back into the right-hand side and repeat this until conver-
gence is reached. Once we obtain δ, we write the unobserved plan characteristics as
ξj = δj − zjβ. Therefore, we form our moment conditions as E[ξ′Z] = 0 and estimate
via GMM.
5 Estimation Details and Results
5.1 Hospital Demand Results
Hospital choice model uses two data sources: patient characteristics come from SID
New Jersey and hospital characteristics come from AHA. We estimate a conditional
logit model where the utility specification is given by:
uihl = θxh + λxhνil + εihl (1.20)
Therefore, utility of patient i who goes to hospital h with diagnosis l depends on
the hospital characteristics xh and interaction of these characteristics with patient
characteristics. Table 4 presents a subset38 of the results from the hospital demand
model. Most hospital characteristics have positive coefficients that are highly signifi-
cant. Same is true for the interaction terms. One of the interaction terms is distance
between the patient’s zip code and the zip code of the hospital he/she visited. Con-
sistent with the previous findings in the literature, we find that having to travel an
extra mile to get treated at a hospital decreases the probability that the patient
will choose that hospital by about 15.8%. Remaining co-variates are interactions of
services offered by the hospital with the relevant MDCs. The results are intuitive.
A patient diagnosed with a circulatory system disease has a strong preference for a
hospital that offers cardiac surgery, while a patient with severe burns is more likely
to go to a hospital that has a burn care unit.
38For the full set of coefficient estimates (not marginal effects) from the conditional logit model,
see Table A1.
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5.2 Health Plan Demand Results
Health plan demand model uses data at the national level. A market is defined as a
state since health plans are observed to serve residents of specific states. An insurance
plan is assumed to be a competitor in a market if it serves the residents of that state.
The logit framework we use takes into account unobservable plan characteristics and




xjkβk + ξj + εij = δj(xj, ξj, β) + εij (1.21)
where the observable plan characteristics xj are plan premium per person per month,
age of the plan, physicians per 1000 population, Weiss rating of the plan, three
measures used by NCQA to obtain the plan performance (consumer satisfaction,
treatment, and prevention), and dummy variables for large plans, PPOs, and NCQA
accreditation. We define a plan as large if it offers multiple plans in several states.
According to this definition, we mark Blue Cross Blue Shield, Aetna, United Health-
care, CIGNA HealthCare, Humana Inc., and Kaiser Foundation Health Plans as large
plans. Consumers’ perceptions about these plans are likely to be reflected in their
preferences.
Since premiums are endogenous, we instrument for them using the average charac-
teristics of other plans (xn, n 6= j) in the same market commonly referred to as BLP
style instruments. These characteristics are age, Weiss rating, number of physicians,
and the NCQA score. These instruments satisfy the three traditional conditions of
instrumental variables. They are relevant as they are correlated with premiums via
competition and markups39, they are uncorrelated with the error term, and they af-
fect utility only through their impact on premiums. To further support the choice of
39as implied by the first order conditions in the supply side and the pricing equation
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Table 1.4: Partial Hospital Demand Results





Beds Per Nurse -0.676∗∗∗ (0.0174)
General Med/Surgical 0.821∗∗∗ (0.224)
Cardiac IC -0.111∗∗∗ (0.0254)
Neonatal IC -0.307∗∗∗ (0.0227)
Burn Care 0.0337 (0.0379)
Birth Room 2.584∗∗∗ (0.0483)
Mammogram -2.394∗∗∗ (0.0359)
Adult Cardiology -1.740∗∗∗ (0.0533)
Chemotherapy 0.944∗∗∗ (0.0650)
Endoscopic Ultrasound -0.235∗∗∗ (0.0269)
Fertility Clinic -0.594∗∗∗ (0.0310)
Neurological Services -0.329∗∗∗ (0.0576)
Oncology 0.894∗∗∗ (0.0714)
Orthopedic 0.130∗∗∗ (0.0390)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging -1.268∗∗∗ (0.0383)
Ultrasound 0.00672 (0.0533)
Kidney Transplant -0.675∗∗∗ (0.0268)
Women’s Health Center 1.356∗∗∗ (0.0329)
Obstetrics*Female Reproductive 0.850∗∗∗ (0.0382)
Obstetrics*Childbirth 0.348∗∗∗ (0.0293)
Neonatal IC*Newborn -0.0290 (0.0161)
Burn Care * Burn 4.223∗∗∗ (0.417)
Birth Room*Childbirth 1.072∗∗∗ (0.0424)
Fertility Clinic*Female Reproductive -0.0904∗∗ (0.0294)
Hemodialysis*Kidney 0.377∗∗∗ (0.0591)
Ultrasound*Birth -0.115∗ (0.0514)
Heart Transplanst*Circulatory 0.734∗∗∗ (0.0358)
Kidney Transplanst*Kidney 0.968∗∗∗ (0.0470)
N 230268
Notes: p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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the instruments, we analyze two statistics. In the regression that includes both fixed
effects, the first stage results report a partial R-squared of 0.77 and an F-statistic of
36.16. These statistics suggest a large portion of the unexplained variation in premi-
ums come from the excluded instruments and the instruments are not weak since the
F-statistic is greater than 10.40
To complete the estimation, we need to calculate the share of the outside good. Since
we observe HMO/POS and PPO/indemnity plans in our data, we define the outside
good as being uninsured. Census data reports number of uninsured and state pop-
ulation by age group. Therefore, we calculate the share of the outside good, s0, by
dividing the number of non-elderly uninsured by the non-elderly population of that
state.
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 5. The first and second column im-
plement Berry (1994) with the difference coming from sample selection based on the
expected utility. As previously mentioned we only observe insurer networks in New
Jersey and Maryland in 2010 and thus restrict our sample in column 2 to only those
states and add expected utility as an insurer characteristic. In column 3 we instead
use the full sample with a single imputed average expected utility interacted with
random coefficients. The fourth column is our final and preferred specification where
expected utility is calculated by age-sex-zipcode groups and premium over income
by zipcode is added to the specification. All specifications with expected utility re-
port a positive coefficients showing that individuals value hospital networks offered
by insurers. The price elasticities of insurers range from 3 to 0.6 with the average
elasticity being 1.76 implying that $100 a month increase in premiums would decrease
the probability a plan is chosen by 33%.
40See Bound et al. (1995).
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Table 1.5: Health Plan Demand Results





































Expected Utility - 0.261**(0.118)
0.106*
(0.062) -








Large Plan FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
BCBS FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 447 35 447 447
R2 0.517 0.941
Notes: Results from GMM estimation. Clustered standard errors (at the
state level) in parentheses. First two columns follow Berry (1994), last two
columns follow BLP (1995). *** statistically significant at 1% level, **
statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.
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5.3 Maryland’s Pricing Rule
For our counterfactuals, we need to know what prices New Jersey hospitals would
charge under a Maryland-style pricing rule. To serve this purpose, we use General-
ized Linear Model (GLM) framework (McCullagh and Nelder (1989)) with log link
from the Gamma family to estimate Maryland’s pricing rule, and use the parameter
estimates to predict what New Jersey hospitals would charge under rate setting.41
Maryland hospitals set their prices for 65 service categories of varying units (such as
renal dialysis per treatment, burn care per patient day, anesthesiology per minute,
observation per hour etc.). We use two measures of price (rates and charges), and
hence run two main regressions. The first one regresses the preset hospital rates
on hospital characteristics and service fixed effects. The second one regresses total
charges per patient on patient severity, case-mix of the hospital, hospital beds, num-
ber of physicians, service mix, payroll expenses, teaching intensity42, depreciation,
ownership status, and DRG fixed effects.43 Results are reported in Table 6.44 We
use the results from column (4) while predicting prices for New Jersey. While the
service rates (not the total charges) are set in Maryland, all service rates are given
in units of time, as we are unable to capture these specifics in our data, we use the
more accurate predictions we are able to obtain through the total charges regressions.
41Similar methods have been used by both Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Shepard (2016b).
42We use resident-to-bed ratio as a measure of teaching intensity. Thorpe (1988) compares different
teaching intensity measures used in the literature and concludes all measures perform similarly in
terms of goodness-of-fit and significance.
43Ideally, we would use All Patient Refined Diagnosis Related Group (APR-DRG) fixed effects
that are adjusted for case-mix and severity instead to capture the use of per case revenue constraints,
however the 2010 SID does not report this variable for Maryland or New Jersey.
44The number of physicians in a hospital is a traditional explanatory variable included in price
regressions in the literature. However, not all hospitals report the number of physicians to the AHA
Survey. For this reason, we use an alternative/less noisy measure (the number of primary care
employees) in our regressions to improve the fit of the model.
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Observations 1,406 1,140 113,480 194,276
Notes: Results from GLM estimation. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses (procedure-
hospital clusters used in the first two columns, DRG-hospital clusters used in the last two columns).
Teaching intensity is measured by resident-to-bed ratio. Elixhauser comordibity measure is the average
at the hospital level for the rate regressions, while it represents number of comordibities at the patient
level for the last two columns. Omitted service category is admission services in the first two columns,
omitted DRG category is DRG=3 (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) or tracheostomy
with major operating room procedure) in column (3), and DRG=1 (heart transplant or implant of heart
assist system) in column (4). Rate regressions include service/procedure fixed effects while regressions
on total charges include DRG fixed effects. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically sig-
nificant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.31
6 Analysis of the Welfare Impact of Price Regulation
This section uses the demand and price estimates obtained in the previous section
to make welfare comparisons between the counterfactual world of a single price per
hospital and allowing hospitals and insurers to set prices individually.
6.1 Allowing for Re-optimization by Insurers
The first step is to take the predicted prices for New Jersey and allow insurers to
re-optimize their premiums and networks offered. It is important to note that in-
surers only choose a single premium in this model and have no tools to individually
price hospitals. This means we can make no comment about co-insurance rates and
how they may affect hospital choice by consumers and insurers. Another important
distinction is that insurers only account for consumer heterogeneity at the level of the
premiums over median income and expected utility as these provide all the consumer
heterogeneity in our market. This means we are assuming away the ability of insurers
to price to the effects of moral hazard or adverse selection present among consumers









By forming the share of patients from insurer j who use hospital h in this way we
are also implicitly assuming that insurers do not take the capacity constraints of
hospitals into consideration when calculating expected costs of a hospital network.









where pil is the probability that an individual of type i is diagnosed with disease l
and sihl is the share of type i individuals who visit hospital h. Now with defined costs
for insurers (hospital prices) and insurer expectations of how individuals who choose
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their plans will utilize hospitals in their networks insurers maximize a standard profit
function by choosing networks and premiums:












where Hj is insurer j’s hospital network, H−j are all other insurers networks.
6.2 Equilibrium
As insurers’ market shares depend not only on their own premiums and hospital
networks but on other insurer networks and premiums, calculation of equilibrium is
computationally infeasible as we would have to check every possible hospital combina-
tion of insurer hospital networks. Not only is it infeasible but there is the possibility
of no equilibrium existing. Instead we approach our analysis in the following way:
1. Assign a number kj to each insurer based on the number of hospitals an insurer
includes of the two largest hospital systems.
2. Define Nj to be the set of hospitals an insurer does not include in his network
plus k hospitals.





combinations for a single insurer leaving other
hospital networks fixed
4. Assign insurer j the hospital network with highest profits
5. Iterate (3) and (4) until no change in hospital networks for any insurer
Our equilibrium search is simplified by and relies upon the following assumptions.
First, this is a game with full information where every insurer observes every other
insurers networks and premiums. We also observe that BCBS covers all hospitals and
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so will not change its hospital network as insurer hospital network sizes are fixed. As
network sizes are fixed there may exist possible profitable deviations, we account for
these by checking all possible single deviations in insurer networks, either the addition
or subtraction of a hospital, and find that profitable deviations do exist and range
from $52,000 to $1,700. In order to eliminate these profitable deviations we assume
a yearly fixed fee of contracting to enforce our equilibrium.
6.3 Producer Surplus
Once we have the new networks and premiums offered, we can calculate the producer
surplus generated by plan j when it contracts with hospital network Hj as:






where M is market size and costh is the expected per-patient costs incurred by hospital











We calculate the producer surplus in the presence and in the absence of bargaining
by summing individual insurer surplus. However, since we do not observe the prices
hospitals charge insurers in the absence of our pricing rule (we do not observe insurer-
hospital pair prices in New Jersey), we can only calculate the total producer surplus,
or the combination of hospital and insurer surplus.45 The total gain in producer
surplus is $2, 239, 394, 865. The main component of gain in surplus comes from BCBS
increasing its premiums. BCBS likely increase its premiums to account for higher
prices from hospitals as it can no longer benefit from its market power when bargaining
over prices. The removal of bargaining here also removes incentives for BCBS to cut
45The ideal would be to have a claims database that reports transaction prices between insurers
and hospitals. If we had such data, we could analyze whehter the individual surplus measures of
hospitals and insurers go up or down once we impose rate setting in New Jersey. Several papers use
such data in the literature. See Dor et al. (2013) and Dor et al. (2004) among others.
34
premiums in order gain market power to use as leverage against hospitals to obtain
lower prices so it is no surprise we see almost a %40 increase in BCBS’s monthly
premiums. All other insurers, except the smallest, decrease premiums and increase
market shares which also provides an increase in total producer surplus.
6.4 Consumer Surplus
The compensating variation is used to measure the change in consumer’s welfare after
Maryland-style pricing is implemented in New Jersey. The compensating variation
refers to the amount of money a consumer would need to give up following a change in
prices or product quality (hospital networks) in order to reach his pre-change utility
level. The compensating variation for consumer i, following Small and Rosen (1981),















where the superscripts post and pre refer to the post price regulation and pre price
regulation time periods respectively. −αi is the marginal utility of income or equiva-
lently the negative of the price coefficient and j still represents an insurance plan. V
is the observed portion of utility




Compensating variation is then the market size times the weighted sum of type i

















where M is market size and αi = β2 + γ2yi . Simulated compensating variation is then
the weighted average of these compensating variations.
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Overall, consumers lose $693 each and the total surplus loss for consumers equals
$1.734 billion. Along with a large loss in surplus we see that the percent uninsured
for all of New Jersey would increase by more than 2.5%. The loss comes partially
from the shift of insurers to lower priced hospitals which generally are valued less in
terms of expected utility for consumers, however the main portion of the loss comes
from the increase in BCBS premiums and consumers unwillingness to switch from
BCBS to another plan.
6.5 Blue Cross Blue Shield Counterfactuals
As mentioned previously, BCBS is the dominant firm in our market of interest, as
well as the largest private insurer in the United States, and has the largest impact on
both producer and consumer surplus. We therefore simulate two more counterfactu-
als to exposit their importance. First, we change BCBS’s optimization process from
Bertrand Nash to a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits where the weight is
calculated using BCBS of Maryland data. Second, we do not allow BCBS to change
at all, we hold its premiums fixed.
Forcing BCBS to optimize over the weighted sum of profit and consumer surplus helps
to account for BCBS acting as a nonprofit firm. Beyond BCBS being a nonprofit firm
it is also the only insurer whose price elasticity is calculated as being in the inelastic
region of demand. The weight for We see that the magnitudes of both changes in pro-
ducer and consumer surplus lessen, although, there is still an overall gain in surplus in
the market. The decrease in consumer surplus is about $769 million or approximately
$307 per person and still driven by the increase in BCBS premiums. We also see that
the change in producer surplus is dominated by BCBS. The amount of uninsured still
increases by .23% but is lower than when all firms competed in a Bertrand Nash game.
In our the final counterfactual where BCBS is not allowed to change its premiums,
the increase in total surplus now comes from an increase in consumer and producer
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Table 1.7: Welfare Results
Bertrand Nash BCBS Weighted CS BCBS No Change
∆ PS 2,239,394,865 985,464,408 107,565,067
∆ CS -1,734,001,234 -769,046,509 7,587,403
∆ BCBS+Hospital Network 1,768,073,630 886,521,548 83,101,438
∆ Other Insurer + Hospital Network 471,321,235 98,942,880 24,463,629
∆ Total Surplus 505,393,631 216,417,899 115,152,470
∆ Uninsured 2.53% .23% -1.46%
surplus, the overall producer surplus increases by $107 million and consumers gain
$7.5 million. Lastly, we observe that the percent of uninsured in the market falls by
1.46% percent.
7 Conclusion
As health care spending continues to increase, an important question is how to con-
trol the costs and spending. This paper empirically assess one method of controlling
a substantial share of those costs, specifically hospitals prices. We use a Maryland-
Style all-payer system, which has proven to be successful at reducing cost growth, to
investigate how a change in price regime effects welfare within the health care market.
We find that an all-payer system would increase total welfare and benefit producers
at the expense of consumers. We argue the effects are driven by the largest insurer
in the market (BCBS) losing the ability to negotiate price reductions from hospitals
and pass those price reductions on to consumers. While state healthcare markets
are very different, the presence of a large private insurer is common. As long as the
large insurer is able to leverage its market power in negotiations with hospitals over
price, we would expect to see similar results from the implementation of an APRS
regulation.
We conclude with possible directions for future research. A straightforward extension
could come from obtaining transaction prices between hospitals and insurers and fur-
ther breaking down how the division of surplus changes at the hospital-insurer level.
We also focus only on a static model with no adverse selection and do not allow any
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hospital or insurer to exit. In general, the implementation of an all-payer system is
most effective over time and can result in exit of hospitals. While it is not the focus




Dataset for Hospital Demand:
Hospital demand model combines two datasets: State Inpatient Databases (SIDs)
from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) that reports patient char-
acteristics, and 2010 American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey Database
that reports hospital characteristics.
We use SIDs for Maryland and New Jersey for the year 2010. SID lists patient’s zip
code46, age, sex, Major Diagnostic Category (MDC), the hospital visited, and the
payer47 (the insurance plan the patient is enrolled in) for all the encounters in that
particular state. AHA data reports hospitals’ location, services offered, accreditation,
total number of hospital beds among other variables.48
Distance of a patient to a hospital is calculated as the distance between two latitude
46Maryland SID does not report patient zip codes. We assigned each in-state patient to a zip
code using other geographic identifiers in the data. First, from the PSTCO variable which reports
patient county FIPS codes, we determined which county the patient lives in. For each county, we
randomly assigned individuals to the zip codes in that county based on the population weights of
each zip code (the weights come from the Census data). Finally, we simulated this process multiple
times to make sure the random assignment gives close to accurate results. For every simulation, we
obtained similar parameter estimates. For out-of-state patients who visited a hospital in Maryland,
we do not observe the county the patient resides in. Instead, we use ZIP3 variable which reports
the first 3 digits of a patient’s zip code. For each observation, we first assign the patient to the
county most frequently occurring in those first 3 digits. Next, these patients are assigned to the
zip code with the highest population percentage in that county that has the same first 3 digits.
The population percentages come from the Census data. We also ran the hospital demand model
excluding Maryland and obtained similar results.
47Available only for Maryland and New Jersey among the states we have.
48For a full list of variables included in the estimation, see Table A1.
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and longitude coordinates which are centers of patient’s zipcode and the hospital’s
latitude and longitude provided by the AHA. A patient’s choice set consists of all the
hospitals within its insurer’s network.
Dataset for Health Plan Demand:
The specification of health plan demand reported in Table 5 uses nationwide health
plan data. A market is defined as a state and a health plan is a competitor in a partic-
ular market if it serves to the residents of that state. Health plan characteristics used
in these models come from AIS Directory of Health Plans 2011, Weiss Ratings Guide
to Health Insurers 2011, and NCQA Health Insurance Plan Rankings 2010-2011.49
AIS data reports total enrollment and number of enrollees by sector (commercial risk,
public risk etc.). This information is used to determine which plans offer commercial
business. We work only with these plans as we are trying to uncover the strategic
decision making process of health insurers.50 Weiss Ratings Guide provides informa-
tion on number of physicians per 1000 patients, total enrollment and total health
premiums earned. The premium per plan is calculated by dividing these total health
premiums by the number of enrollees as reported by AIS. Whenever the enrollment
data was unavailable from this source, we used the enrollment data from the Weiss
Ratings Guide. The rest of our insurance plan characteristics come from NCQA’s
report on Health Insurance Plan Rankings.51 These include plan type (which we ag-
gregate to two categories: HMO/POS and PPO/Indemnity) and states served, along
with different measures of plan quality. An overall score between 0 and 100 is re-
ported for each plan that takes into account NCQA accreditation standards, member
satisfaction and clinical measures. This source also reports a score between 1 and 5
for the following categories: treatment, prevention, and consumer satisfaction. The
clinical quality measures (treatment and prevention) are calculated using a subset of
49All these datasets report data on 2010.
50Using health plans that only serve to Medicare or Medicaid patients would not work as they do
not set a price to maximize their profits, their price per unit of care is preset by the government.
51We mainly used this report for 2010-2011, missing data was filled by using the report from
2011-2012.
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the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) measures whereas
consumer satisfaction measure comes from the HEDIS survey which is overseen by
the Agency for Health Care Quality (AHRQ). Consumer satisfaction measure cov-
ers patients’ satisfaction with health plans (handling claims, customer service etc.),
satisfaction with physicians (doctors’ communication, care received etc.) and access
of getting care in terms of ease and promptness. The treatment measure evaluates
scores in subcategories such as asthma, diabetes, heart attack, and mental health.
Finally, the prevention score assesses measures such as timeliness of prenatal check
ups, breast cancer screening and early immunizations.
For the last specification used in health plan demand estimation, the above dataset
was supplemented with SIDs from New Jersey and Maryland. SID is used to calculate
the expected utility for patient type q, and to construct the hospital networks each
health plan offers. Following Lewis and Pflum (2013), a hospital is assumed to be in
a plan’s network if more than 10 enrollees of that plan visited that hospital.
Dataset for Price Regressions:
Dataset for price regressions combines data from various sources: AHA, SID, CMS,
and HSCRC. We use two dependent variables: preset hospital rates and total charges
per patient (both in Maryland). The first one is obtained from the rate reports on
HSCRC’s website.52 We use rates by hospital for the fiscal year 2010. Our second
dependent variable, the total charges per patient, is available from the SID files.
The independent variables gather information from various sources. The case-mix
index (CMI) contains information about the resource consumption of the hospital
based on the complexity of treatment, diversity, and needs of its patients. CMI per
hospital is calculated by applying the DRG weights specified by CMS53 to the observed
52http : //www.hscrc.state.md.us/hspRates2.cfm
53These weights reflect the average hospital resource use by patients in that DRG cat-
egory divided by the average hospital resource use by all patients. We follow the ap-
proach adopted by California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development
(OSHPD) in applying weights for Medicare patients to all patient discharge data. See
https://www.oshpd.ca.gov/HID/Products/PatDischargeData/CaseMixIndex/CMI/ExampleCalculation.pdf
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(from SID) patient base of each hospital. 54 We created the Elixhauser comordibity
measure at the patient level using the International Classification of Diseases, Clinical
Modification (ICD-9-CM) and DRG (version 24) codes from the SID data. The AHA
data was used to obtain teaching intensity (resident-to-bed ratio), number of primary
care employees, number of physicians, number of hospital beds, for-profit status,
depreciation expense (divided by $100,000), and services offered.
1.B Competition and Regulation in Health Care
The debate on how to contain health care costs offers two imperfect solutions: compe-
tition and regulation. Proponents of competition argue that market forces are capable
of driving the health care prices down, therefore there is no need for the government
to intervene. The efforts that used competition as a tool in the past did not result in
substantial decrease in health care expenditure, primarily due to the fact that health
care markets are far from being perfectly competitive. Proponents of regulation, on
the other hand, argue that the incentive structure in the health care sector makes
it impossible for the free markets to deliver efficient outcomes, therefore government
regulation is needed.
Health care markets do not fit in the definition of perfect competition for many rea-
sons. In particular, health care markets are characterized by asymmetric information,
barriers to entry and exit, differentiated products, market power of providers and in-
surers. The seminal work by Arrow (1963) states that the health care markets suffer
from market failures due to uncertainty and information problems. Patients know nei-
ther the care they need to receive nor the true costs of the care. They rely solely on
their physicians when making choices about their treatment, and solely on their insur-
ers when paying for the treatment they received. They are different than a consumer
in a competitive market who chooses among alternatives with complete information.
Furthermore, the incentive structure of the health care system leads to inefficiencies,
54The case-mix index per hospital is calculated by dividing the sum of all the DRG weights in
that hospital by the total number of discharges in 2010 following the formula used by CMS.
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overuse, and excessive expenditures. Providers, who determine the charges, have an
incentive to provide excess care at higher prices as this will bring them more revenue.
Patients, on the other hand, are not responsive to these increasing charges as they are
covered by their insurance plans. Lastly, the increased insurance coverage creates an
artificial demand and supply for the medical services due to the moral hazard effect.
All these factors result in increased health expenditure. Therefore, the laissez-faire
approach is not likely to work in the health care market and government intervention
is usually considered to improve the functioning of these markets.
Hospital markets, in particular, are far from a competitive ideal. Presence of hospital
systems with market power, differentiated services and quality offered by each hos-
pital, and possible overuse of hospital services due to expanding health insurance55
indicate that a profit maximizing hospital will not achieve the most efficient out-
come like a competitive firm, especially when the well-being of the other agents in
the market is considered. Given this nature and the form of financing of the health
care sector, Altman and Weiner (1978) suggest regulation to be used as a second-best
choice, a necessary solution even if not the most desirable one.
Increase in health care spending in the U.S. has been influenced by price-related fac-
tors such as inflation and increase in hospital costs as well as by non-price factors
such as technology, use, and intensity.56 Federal and state governments tried both free
markets and regulation as means to contain costs in response to constantly increasing
national health care expenditure. While specific programs had different impacts on
health care costs, neither approach led to a substantial decrease in the overall expen-
diture. Among the regulatory policies, state-level hospital rate setting and Medicare’s
Prospective Payment System (PPS) were the two major programs that proved to be
effective in cutting costs.57
55See for example, Feldstein (1973).
56For a detailed breakdown of health expenditure growth in the past half century, see Catlin and
Cowan (2015).
57PPS and state rate setting are similar in nature as they are both prospective payment systems
that limit revenues and charges based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Davis et al. (1990),
43
In the 1960s, expenditure growth was mostly due to increased use of medical ser-
vices. Over this period, the hospital sector in the U.S. was characterized by almost
no regulation. Government intervention in this decade was in the form of financing
research to develop better treatment techniques, improving access to and quality of
health care, renovating and building new hospitals. The increase in the growth rate
of health spending led to implementation of several regulatory programs, particularly
in the hospital industry, in the early 1970s.
Government intervention during this period aimed to eliminate waste and inefficien-
cies in the hospital business as well as to control price growth. Certificate-of-need
(CON) programs were adopted at the state level starting at the end of 1960s. These
programs restricted hospital investment decisions and made state approval necessary
for expanding/modernizing capacity, purchasing new diagnostic equipment, provid-
ing new services, and even entry of new hospitals. Such programs were adopted by
most states by mid-1970s with the passing of 1974 National Health Planning Act and
Section 1122 review of 1972 Social Security Act Amendments.58 These amendments
also gave rise to utilization review to control the quantity and quality of medical
procedures. If the Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) reviewed a
procedure and deemed it unneccesary, Medicare payments for that procedure could
be denied to the hospital. Other controls implemented were Nixon administration’s
Economic Stabilization Program (ESP) and hospital rate and budget controls. ESP
was implemented between 1971-1974 to slow price growth in the overall economy.
Controlled hospital prices, wages, and input costs led to a decrease in expenditure.
Price controls in the health care sector resulted in higher utilization and lower medi-
Eby and Cohodes (1985), Friedman and Coffey (1993), Sloan (1983, 1988) all emphasize the relative
success of mandatory rate setting in the context of cost containment.
58By 1979, all but three states adopted CON regulations. Different from CON regulations, Section
1122 programs were established by the federal government and adopted by state governments on
a voluntary basis. These programs targeted hospital expenditures on federal programs (mostly
Medicare and Medicaid) and made planning agency approval necessary to get full reimbursement on
expenditures exceeding a threshold. Literature showed these programs had no effect on costs and
input use. See Sloan (1981) for details.
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cal costs. Removal of ESP in 1974 along with the increase in economy-wide inflation
partly due to the oil shocks resulted in a period of rapid price growth.
In the 1974-1982 period, growth in health care prices accounted for about 70 percent
of the growth in nominal personal health care spending.59 The 1983-1992 period was
characterized by a slowdown in both the growth of health care spending and the
growth of medical care prices. Main driving factors of this slowdown were changes in
the payment systems (transition to PPS) and increased enrollment in private health
plans and self-insured plans. PPS for Medicare was enacted in 1983 as previous efforts
to control hospital cost inflation (comprehensive planning, the PSRO effort, second-
opinion surgery etc.) were unsuccessful.60 On the health plan frontier, HMOs and
other managed care plans gained popularity in 1990s as employers saw these plans
as a way to cut spending on medical care. The ability of these plans to negotiate
price with providers drove the health care prices down in the 1993-1999 period and
growth in health care price growth decreased to 2.5%. The trend of rapid growth of
enrollment in these restricted-network plans was reversed in 2000-2002 as consumer
preferences changed.61 During this period, growth in price of health care accounted
for 40 percent of the average growth in personal health care spending. Health care
expenditure growth has slowed down in 2003-2013 period primarily due to increase in
the number of cheaper generic drugs and severe economic recession, yet the increase
in price of health care still accounted for half of the increase in the average growth of
personal health care expenditure.
59During this period, in response to federal and state governments’ attempts to cap and con-
trol hospital prices, hospitals started a movement called known as “Voluntary Effort" where they
promised to control prices within their own hospitals. The movement failed quickly as hospital price
inflation increased from 13% in 1980 to 18% in 1981. See Mayes (2007) and Sloan (1983).
60See Schramm et al. (1986).
61Consumers were concerned about receiving constrained care under such plans. Employers also
abandoned these plans as the decrease in cost was a one-time advantage and managed care plans still
increased their costs due to increases in consumer demand and improvements in technology. The
shift in preferences that increased enrollment in less restrictive plans (such as Preferred Provider
Organizations (PPOs) and Point of Service (POS) plans) in addition to the increase in the number
of hospital mergers and hospital system transferred the leverage to hospitals.
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These historical facts reflect that health care price growth has played a major role in
national health expenditure growth. Hospital costs today constitute the largest share
of the total expenditure62 which makes them an important target. In the past, the
growth in health care prices was managed by market forces (such as proliferation of
insurers that have bargaining power over hospitals, competition among hospitals, or
recession) or by price controls (such as ESP and rate setting). In today’s market, it
would be a doubtful approach to rely on the market forces alone given the increased
market power of hospitals and hospital systems who have profit motives. Therefore,
we propose applying a regulatory approach that aims to mimic competitive outcomes
by correcting disincentives and restoring missing incentives in a market that is far
from a competitive ideal.63 The rate setting rule implemented in Maryland over the
past 45 years not only has been successful in cutting health expenditure, but also
encouraged use of competition to serve this purpose. Our analysis shows that imple-
mentation of this rule in a similar regulatory environment results in welfare gains.
1.C Full Hospital Choice Model Estimates
The full set of parameter estimates from the hospital demand model are reported in
Table A1.
Table A1: Hospital Demand Estimates






62 CMS reports that hospital costs accounted for 30.7% of the U.S. health care spending, followed
by physician services that accounted for 20% of the overall expenditure.
63Schramm et al. (1986) argues that regulatory and procompetitive approaches are fundamentally








Bed Size 0.287∗∗∗ (0.00575)
Dist*Nervous System 0.0453∗∗∗ (0.0131)










Dist*Male Reproductive 0.0402∗∗ (0.0132)








Dist*Other Factors 0.0446∗∗∗ (0.0132)
Dist*Multiple Sig Trauma 0.0448∗∗∗ (0.0132)
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General Med/Surgical 0.821∗∗∗ (0.224)
Obstetrics -0.586∗∗∗ (0.0435)
Cardiac IC -0.111∗∗∗ (0.0254)
Neonatal IC -0.307∗∗∗ (0.0227)
Neonatal Intermediate -1.859∗∗∗ (0.0440)
Burn Care 0.0337 (0.0379)
Birth Room 2.584∗∗∗ (0.0483)
Blood Donor Hos -0.566∗∗∗ (0.0222)
Mammogram -2.394∗∗∗ (0.0359)
Adult Cardiology -1.740∗∗∗ (0.0533)
Diagnostic Catheterization -0.416∗∗∗ (0.0417)
Cardiac Catheterization 0.630∗∗∗ (0.0228)
Cardiac Surgery 0.0379 (0.0320)
Cardiac Electrophysiology -0.802∗∗∗ (0.0348)
Cardiac Rehabilitation -0.288∗∗∗ (0.0242)
Chemotherapy 0.944∗∗∗ (0.0650)
Optical Colonoscopy 1.485∗∗∗ (0.0271)
Endoscopic Ultrasound -0.235∗∗∗ (0.0269)
Ablation of Esophagus -0.628∗∗∗ (0.0175)
ERCP 0.161∗∗∗ (0.0201)
ESWL 0.461∗∗∗ (0.0186)
Fertility Clinic -0.594∗∗∗ (0.0310)
Hemodialysis -0.418∗∗∗ (0.0302)
HIV-AIDS Services 0.373∗∗∗ (0.0277)
Neurological Services -0.329∗∗∗ (0.0576)
Oncology 0.894∗∗∗ (0.0714)
Othopedic 0.130∗∗∗ (0.0390)
Diagnostic Radioisotope -0.640∗∗∗ (0.0502)
Full-field Mammography 0.472∗∗∗ (0.0248)
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Magnetic Resonance Imaging -1.268∗∗∗ (0.0383)
Multislice Spiral Tomography 0.680∗∗∗ (0.0450)
Multislice Spiral Tomography64 1.929∗∗∗ (0.0252)
Positron Emission Tomography -0.286∗∗∗ (0.0206)
Ultrasound 0.00672 (0.0533)
Heart Transplans 1.698∗∗∗ (0.0511)
Kidney Transplanst -0.675∗∗∗ (0.0268)
Liver Transplanst 3.125∗∗∗ (0.0492)
Lung Transplanst -0.852∗∗∗ (0.0586)
Tissue Transplanst -0.102 (0.0524)
Virtual Colonoscopy 1.219∗∗∗ (0.0281)
Women’s Health Center 1.356∗∗∗ (0.0329)
General Med/Surgical*Nervous -2.452∗∗∗ (0.187)
General Med/Surgical*Eye 1.456∗∗∗ (0.407)
General Med/Surgical*Ear/Nose/Throat 0.648∗ (0.270)
General Med/Surgical*Circulatory -1.232∗∗∗ (0.129)
General Med/Surgical*Hepatobiliary 1.823∗∗∗ (0.175)
General Med/Surgical*Skin 0.325∗ (0.164)
General Med/Surgical*Male Reproductive 0.732∗ (0.345)
General Med/Surgical*Female Reproductive 0.210 (0.127)
General Med/Surgical*Childbirth -1.710∗∗∗ (0.0753)
General Med/Surgical*Multiple Sig Trauma -0.108 (0.168)
Obstetrics*Female Reproductive 0.850∗∗∗ (0.0382)
Obstetrics*Childbirth 0.348∗∗∗ (0.0293)
Cardiac IC*Circulatory 0.225∗∗∗ (0.0463)
Neonatal IC*Childbirth 0.0184 (0.0166)
Neonatal IC*Newborn -0.0290 (0.0161)
Neonatal Intermediate*Childbirth 0.733∗∗∗ (0.0309)
Neonatal Intermediate*Newborn 0.680∗∗∗ (0.0293)
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Burn Care * Burn 4.223∗∗∗ (0.417)
Birth Room*Childbirth 1.072∗∗∗ (0.0424)
Birth Room*Newborn 0.213∗∗∗ (0.0309)
Blood Donor Hos*Circulatory -0.0648∗ (0.0318)
Blood Donor Hos*Blood Disorders 0.874∗∗∗ (0.0715)
Mammogram*Subcutaneous Tissue -0.104 (0.0812)
Adult Cardiology*Circulatory 1.036∗∗∗ (0.125)
Diagnostic Catheterization*Kidney 0.407∗∗∗ (0.0721)
Cardiac Catheterization*Circulatory -0.255∗∗∗ (0.0591)
Cardiac Surgery*Circulatory 2.292∗∗∗ (0.0732)
Cardiac Electrophysiology*Circulatory 0.101 (0.0744)






Chemotherapy*Male Reproductive 1.199∗∗∗ (0.287)
Chemotherapy*Female Reproductive -0.812∗∗∗ (0.103)
Chemotherapy*Blood 0.115 (0.296)
Optical Colonoscopy*Digestive 0.490∗∗∗ (0.0449)
Endoscopic Ultrasound*Digestive -0.137∗∗∗ (0.0403)





Fertility Clinic*Female Reproductive -0.0904∗∗ (0.0294)
Hemodialysis*Kidney 0.377∗∗∗ (0.0591)
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Oncology*Male Reproductive -0.642∗∗ (0.197)
Oncology*Female Reproductive 1.443∗∗∗ (0.128)
Oncology*Blood 0.676∗ (0.295)
Diagnostic Radioisotope*Ear/Nose/Throat 0.0559 (0.197)
Diagnostic Radioisotope*Respiratory -0.649∗∗∗ (0.108)
Diagnostic Radioisotope*Circulatory -0.821∗∗∗ (0.0866)
Full-field Mammography*Subcutaneoud Tissue 0.120 (0.0675)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging* Nervous 1.532∗∗∗ (0.127)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging*Respiratory 0.778∗∗∗ (0.0981)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging*Circulatory 0.699∗∗∗ (0.0910)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging*Digestive 0.661∗∗∗ (0.0679)
Magnetic Resonance Imaging*Male Reproductive 0.703∗∗∗ (0.195)
Multislice Spiral Tomography*Nervous 1.326∗∗∗ (0.0828)
Multislice Spiral Tomography*Respiratory 0.0334 (0.0638)
Multislice Spiral Tomography*Circulatory -1.175∗∗∗ (0.127)
Multislice Spiral Tomography64*Nervous -0.0434 (0.0463)
Multislice Spiral Tomography64*Respiratory 0.113∗ (0.0540)
Multislice Spiral Tomography64*Circulatory -0.716∗∗∗ (0.0420)
Positron Emission Tomography*Nervous 0.473∗∗∗ (0.0316)
Positron Emission Tomography*Respiratory 0.284∗∗∗ (0.0374)
Positron Emission Tomography*Circulatory 0.0971∗∗ (0.0309)
Positron Emission Tomography*Subcutaneous Tissue 0.0382 (0.0415)
Ultrasound*Birth -0.115∗ (0.0514)
Heart Transplanst*Circulatory 0.734∗∗∗ (0.0358)
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Kidney Transplanst*Kidney 0.968∗∗∗ (0.0470)
Liver Transplanst*Digestive -0.0213 (0.0870)
Lung Transplanst*Respiratory 0.599∗∗∗ (0.0921)
Tissue Transplanst*Subcutaneous Tissue -0.0115 (0.0546)
Virtual Colonoscopy*Digestive -0.107∗∗ (0.0392)
Women’s Health Center*Female Reproductive System 0.0215 (0.0530)
N 230268
Notes: p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTRACTS IN THE UPFRONT MARKET FOR NATIONAL
TELEVISION ADVERTISING (WITH JULIE MORTIMER AND SYLVIA
HRISTAKEVA)
1 Introduction
Firms contract with each other to access inputs of production and to reach customers.
These contracts are often complex, aiming to align the incentives of the two parties.
Economic theory indicates that the repeated nature of firms’ interactions may be used
to align these incentives. That is, static contracts may also depend on past relation-
ships, learning, or reputation. As a result, firms with the same ‘static characteristics’
may face different contracts. This paper analyzes the contracts used in the television
advertising market. The institutional practices in this market have established that
past relationships influence firms’ terms-of-trade; hence, firms may face different costs
when accessing national television advertising.
Inter-firm contracts may affect competition in both upstream and downstream
markets, and in turn total welfare. Commonly, firms that compete in a downstream
market also face the same competitors in the input market. Theoretical work has
analyzed how differences in input costs may affect market competition, firms’ entry
and investment decisions, and merger incentives (Tirole (1988)).1 Furthermore, ad-
vertising itself may have strategic implications for shaping market competition. For
example, Sutton (1991) proposes a model in which incumbents endogenously invest
1For example, DeGraba (1990) shows that variable input markets affect firms’ choices of long-run
production technology. Alternatively, firms may strategically attempt to limit competitors’ access
to an input of production (Eső et al. (2010)). In the television market, Dukes and Gal-Or (2003)
develop a model to rationalize exclusive contracts between an advertiser and a network. We do
not consider exclusive contracts because most advertising purchases are not subject to exclusivity
arrangements.
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in advertising, with the result that they maintain concentration in the market as it
grows. In our setup, the structure of the market for national television advertising
solidifies the advantages of incumbent firms that have previously established a rela-
tionship in the market. Importantly, we argue that the length of the relationship a
firm has maintained with national television networks is an important driver of cost
advantages in this market.
The competitive effects of accessing cheaper advertising have been considered by
both academics and antitrust authorities. Porter (1976) raises the concern that na-
tional firms benefit from advertising nationally, and that this competitive advantage
may create barriers to entry for small local firms. A similar concern was raised when
the FTC challenged Procter & Gamble’s acquisition of Clorox in 1957. In the market
for liquid bleach, advertising is an important competitive instrument. The Commis-
sion was concerned that after the acquisition, Clorox would be able to access national
advertising at a discount relative to its competitors; therefore, the merger would
discourage competition and entry in that market.2 Today, the Antitrust authori-
ties would not consider such efficiencies as anti-competitive. Instead, they would be
treated in the same way as, for example, distribution efficiencies (Mensch and Free-
man (1990)). In this project, we do not explicitly model downstream competition, or
the ways in which differences in the cost of advertising may affect market outcomes.
Instead, we focus on documenting these cost differences.
Advertising is an important input in the production of most final products sold
to consumers. Despite the recent increase in digital media and online advertising,
television advertising still commands the majority of ad dollars spent.3 National
television ads accounted for $45 billion in 2016, with firms like Proctor & Gamble
spending almost a billion dollars. Nevertheless, firms are not on equal ground when
accessing this input market. Industry practices in the television advertising market
2During the 1950s and 1960s, firms purchased advertising by sponsoring television programming.
As a result, larger firms were better positioned to access national television advertising. In the
early 1960s, the networks changed the way they sell advertising to the practices used today. Several
studies showed that once the market changed in the 1960s, large advertisers in broadcast networks
stopped benefiting from discounts (Blank (1968) and Peterman and Carney (1978)).
3Digital advertising only reached parity with television in the last quarter of 2017 (Slefo (2017)).
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have evolved so that firms often pay different prices to reach the same audience.
Price differences are so common that the industry refers to advertisers being either
‘good money’ or ‘bad money’. The term ‘good money’ refers to advertisers who
pay relatively high prices, while ‘bad money’ is commonly associated with legacy
advertisers who receive grandfathered low prices. Industry practitioners suggest that
continued relationships with an advertiser is the main driver of the price differentials,
not the size of a firm’s advertising budget.4 As a consequence, legacy firms, which
have long advertising relationships with networks, face lower costs for the same ad
inventory.
The practice of rewarding legacy firms with lower advertising prices for the same
program airing dates back to the beginning of the national television advertising
market in the 1960s (Lotz (2007)). New clients negotiate prices during the first year
in which they advertise in a network. All returning advertisers face prices that evolve
as a percentage change from their ‘base rate’ (the price they paid in the previous
year). The difference between legacy and non-legacy prices has emerged because
negotiated prices for new businesses have been consistently higher than the prices
paid by returning businesses. We refer to the lower costs faced by legacy firms as a
‘legacy discount’ in the remainder of the paper.
This work takes the first step in analyzing whether firms face different costs to
access the input market for national television advertising. A challenge in studying
inter-firm contracts is that firms consider these contracts as trade secrets, and data
on the terms of the contracts are rarely available. We do not observe individual
prices paid by firms. Thus, we rely on both reduced-form and structural approaches
to document and quantify the presence of legacy discounts. We combine institu-
tional knowledge of contracting practices with the input-sourcing decisions of firms
to identify the value of continued relationships in the national market for television
advertising.
Industry practitioners suggest that the size of legacy discounts is likely to be larger
4In 2005, a media spending audit uncovered that firms pay different prices for identical time and
space in the market for national television advertising. In addition, the report concludes that these
“price differentials are not associated with the size of firms’ advertising budgets” (Bloom (2005)).
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for broadcast rather than cable networks. Thus, we speculate that if legacy firms ben-
efit from discounts on broadcast, then they will choose to reach a disproportionately
larger fraction of their viewers on these networks. Controlling for firms’ industries,
budgets, and digital advertising strategies, we find that these patterns exist in the
data. We interpret this as suggestive evidence of legacy discounts. We repeat the
analysis for audiences with different demographic profiles to confirm the robustness
of the result.
Given the reduced-form evidence, our analysis continues with a structural model
in order to quantify the size of legacy discounts. The structural model uses average
prices along with firm decisions of where and how much to advertise to identify these
discounts. We assume that firms are making optimal advertising decisions after their
budget is set exogenously and they do not take into account where or how competitors
advertise. Results suggest an average legacy discount of about 8%.
We evaluate the role of these cost differences through the lens of efficiency gains
from a merger. Firms typically refer to efficiency rationales as a primary justification
for a merger; however, cost savings are hard to identify and measure.5 Our setup
identifies an input market where a merger may decrease firms’ costs even if the firms
operate in unrelated downstream markets. If the merging parties have different costs
to access the market for national television advertising, then, according to industry
practitioners, the newly-merged firm is able to purchase inventory at the lower price.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation highlights the importance of these discounts for
advertising firms and networks. Keeping average prices and firm advertising selections
fixed, the results suggest that a merger between a legacy and a non-legacy firm will
generate, on average, cost savings of at least $2 million through the lower cost to
access the market for national television advertising. These benefits are a lower bound
because the calculation does not allow the firm to re-optimize its advertising mix.
5Merger analyses highlight the tradeoff between potential production efficiencies and upward
pricing pressures following a horizontal merger (Williamson (1968)). Most empirical work has focused
on understanding how the change in competition following a merger influences prices or product
characteristics (see Ashenfelter et al. (2014) for a survey). The evidence on cost savings from a
merger is scarce due to the difficulties in identifying and measuring potential gains in efficiency.
Ashenfelter et al. (2015) is an exception, where the authors analyze whether cost savings may offset
the incentives to raise prices.
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These cost savings will not be due to economies of scale or an improved bargaining
position.
The question of what features of the market lead to the persistence of legacy
discounts arises naturally. There are at least three potential rationales that we are
pursuing in a separate project. For example, such price differentials may be explained
by price discrimination or bargaining. In addition, industry practitioners suggest that
demand uncertainty might be driving these price differentials. That is, legacy firms
benefit from favorable bases as a “reward" for maintaining consistent business, even
when demand is soft. One of the many unwritten expectations of the upfront market
is that legacy firms are expected to maintain “consistent" spending with a network in
order to keep benefiting from their grandfathered base rates (Lotz (2007)).
The nature of the market connects this project to two separate literatures; studies
of two-sided markets, and studies of the role of advertising for market competition.
Television networks connect viewers’ demand for programing on one side, and adver-
tisers’ demand for audiences on the other side. The literature on two-sided markets
carefully studies consumers’ choice and the incentives of media companies in balanc-
ing the two sides of the market. However the advertising side of the market has
received less attention empirically.6 Advertising competition is well-studied theoreti-
cally in setups that disregard firms’ input-sourcing choices (see Bagwell (2007) for a
survey). In these cases, the effect of advertising on market structure and welfare de-
pends on the way advertising influences consumers: whether it provides information
or it affects consumers’ utility derived from the product.7 Differences in firms’ costs
6Theoretically, Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) provide a framework for analyzing
pricing incentives in two-sided markets. Anderson and Coate (2005) study equilibrium advertising
levels and amount of programming in a setup where viewers incur a nuisance cost from ad exposure.
Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006) provide a review of two-sided markets for advertising-sponsored
media industries. Empirically, two-sided media industries are analyzed in the context of consolidation
of local newspapers (Fan (2013)), network effects of Yellow Pages (Rysman (2004)), entry of radio
stations (Berry and Waldfogel (1999)). Wilbur (2008) studies the national television market and
finds that advertisers’ preferences influence networks’ choice of programming more strongly than
viewers’ preferences. These studies provide a careful analysis of the consumer and media side of the
problem, while using only aggregate demand for advertising.
7Doraszelski and Markovich (2007) extends our understanding of the role of informative and
goodwill advertising for market structure to a dynamic setup. Most empirical studies focus on
determining how consumers respond to advertising (Ackerberg (2001), Dubé et al. (2005), Shapiro
(2018)). Researchers have also used data from firms’ advertising choices to infer information about
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to advertise can affect the theoretical implications for both two-sided markets and
advertising competition. For example, Doraszelski and Markovich (2007) show that
the cost to advertise influences industry structure when advertising is persuasive. In
this project, we do not model networks’ optimal choices or downstream competition
between firms. Instead, we attempt to infer unobserved information about contracts
in the market for national television advertising.
The inherent hesitation of firms to provide information about their contracting
practices and to share data on terms-of-trade and costs is an impediment to empirical
analyses of inter-firm contracts and input costs. As a result, this project relates to the
empirical works that rely on firms’ observed choices and equilibrium assumptions to
back out terms-of-trade and firm costs (Berto Villas-Boas (2007), Mortimer (2008b),
Berry and Haile (2014), Hristakeva (2018)).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 covers the market for
national television advertising, Section 3 explains the unique data set we use in esti-
mation, Section 4 performs reduced for analysis of legacy discounts, Section 5 covers
our discrete-continuous choice structural model, Section 6 discusses the estimation
and parametrization of our structural model, and Section 7 covers the results.
2 Market for national television advertising
Networks sell national advertising inventory in two markets: the ‘upfront’ and the
‘scatter.’8 The scatter market sells ad slots close to the air date of a program. Prices
are determined by the market, with little or no price discrimination between ad-
competition. Vilcassim et al. (1999) test different modes of conduct with respect to price and
advertising competition. Dubé and Manchanda (2005) find that advertising has different effects
on price competition depending on market size. Qi (2013) exploits market dynamics after the
cigarette advertising ban of 1971 and concludes that such restrictions lead to a more concentrated
industry structure. Chandra and Weinberg (2018) uses a merger in the U.S. brewing industry to
analyze empirically the relationship between market structure and firms’ advertising expenditures.
Scott Morton (2000) and Ellison and Ellison (2011) study whether firms use advertising as an
entry deterrent in the pharmaceutical industry. For earlier empirical cross-industry analyses of the
association between advertising and entry refer to Bagwell (2007).
8Firms may also purchase ads in specific geographic regions through local affiliates. These ads are
typically sold to local advertisers, such as car dealers, professional services, local retailers, political
ads. Industry participants refer to these local markets as the ‘spot’ market. We do not observe local
advertisements, and our focus throughout is on the national ads sold by the national networks.
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vertisers. The scatter market, however, is relatively small, with broadcast networks
(ABC, NBC, CBS, FOX, and CW) selling about 20% of their ad inventory on the
scatter, and cable networks selling roughly half of their inventory through this mar-
ket (Bollapragada et al. (2008)). Instead, most ad slots are sold through the upfront
market.
The upfront market dates back to the 1960s and involves selling national televi-
sion advertising for the upcoming season in advance. Each spring, between March
and June, networks organize events to preview and promote their programming for
the upcoming Fall television season. Advertisers attend the presentations and nego-
tiate with networks over a programming mix for their ads. An important benefit of
purchasing in the upfront market relates to the availability of programming. Popular
television series often sell all their inventory in the upfront market, meaning that
only restricted inventory is available in the scatter market. In addition to securing
premium ad inventory, advertising firms typically receive discounts relative to the
scatter market for purchasing in advance.9 Firms with long advertising relationships
also benefit from firm-specific legacy discounts.
In practice, most advertisers work with ad agencies to create advertising cam-
paigns for their products, determine advertising budgets, and recommend a program-
ming mix. Ad agencies also negotiate on behalf of their clients in the upfront market.
The upfront typically proceeds in two steps (Lotz (2007)). First, agencies negotiate
each client’s ‘program mix’ allocation in a network.10 The programming-mix nego-
tiations are over blocks of ad slots that reach audiences with similar demographic
profiles, rather than at the level of the individual commercial in a specific television
show.
Once the programming mix is established, agencies negotiate prices. Prices are
described as ‘cost per mille’ (CPM), or the cost to reach one thousand viewers. CPM
rates vary by audience size and viewer demographics of the program, seasonality,
9Scatter rates commonly average roughly 15 percent higher than average upfront prices (Lotz
(2007)).
10“Some clients are more involved and request to see mixes as the agency negotiates with the
network." (Lotz (2007))
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as well as, by advertiser. The price determination process differs between new and
returning business. In the case of new accounts for a network, agencies separately
negotiate a CPM for each new firm, which becomes its base rate for the following year’s
upfront. For all returning business, agencies negotiate a uniform percent increase (or
rarely a decrease) that is applied to each firm’s base rate to determine its price.
These base rates reflect the prices firms paid in the previous upfront. For example, if
Proctor & Gamble’s (P&G) base rate with ABC in 2011 is $10, and ABC secures a
10% increase in prices in 2012, then P&G will pay a CPM of $11 in the 2012 upfront
market.
The structure of this market suggests that price differentials may arise from differ-
ences in bargaining outcomes due to, for example, differences in advertising budgets
or differences in bargaining abilities or positions of media buying agencies. Indus-
try reports and narratives suggest that neither of these explanations are driving the
market. In 2005, an auditor of media spending, Media Performance Monitor Amer-
ica (MPMA), analyzed actual prices paid by major U.S. advertisers.11 The report
documents the presence of price variation across firms for identical time and space in
the upfront (Bloom (2005)). The findings show that firms may pay prices that are as
much as 50% lower than the prices faced by firms on the other side of the distribution.
The report further reveals that these deals are not associated with the size of the firm
or the advertising agency.12
We do not observe the identities of the media buying agencies employed by each
firm, and we assume that differentials across firms are not driven by the identity of the
agency used during the upfront negotiations. The MPMA’s report provides support
for this assumption. In addition, industry participants report that the various agen-
cies all secure similar percent increases (or decreases) during the upfront market. For
example, over the last few years, viewership (as measured in gross ratings points) has
decreased, while demand for television advertising has remained unchanged, leading
to price increases for all firms regardless of agency.
11At the time, MPMA’s clients accounted for $3 billion in advertising expenditure.
12Industry participants report that very recently, a few very large firms have been able to negotiate
lower base rates despite having a shorter history with the networks.
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Instead, practitioners suggest that prices for new businesses are, on average, higher
than prices paid by firms with established base rates. As a result, variation in prices is
associated with the length of an advertiser’s relationship with networks in the upfront
market. Typically, legacy firms, with long histories of participation in the upfront,
benefit from low ‘grandfathered’ base rates; while newer firms have higher base rates,
on average. The uniform price adjustments across all clients in the market suggest
that the price differentials across firms persist over time. In the example above, ABC
secured a 10% increase in its CPMs, and this percent increase is applied to all of its
returning advertisers. Suppose that Netflix has a base rate of $20 in 2011. Then,
Netflix’s base rate in 2012 is $22. This example shows that P&G’s percent discount
vis-a-vis Netflix, in the upfront market, does not change over time: 50%. Given that
broadcasters sell approximately 80% of their ad slots in the upfront, we expect that
the benefits of lower pricing to legacy advertisers are disproportionately captured in
broadcast programming.
The contracts in the market for national television advertising are further compli-
cated by audience guarantees, firm and optionable buys, and multi-year arrangements.
First, for all upfront purchases, the networks guarantee audience delivery. This im-
plies that, if a program viewership is lower than the contracted expected viewership,
then the networks provides additional ad spots. Alternatively, if the viewership is
larger than predicted, then the advertiser captures these gains at no additional cost.
To fulfill these audience guarantees, the networks reserve some inventory in advance,
which may affect inventory availability and prices in the scatter market. Next, ad-
vertisers have some flexibility to adjust their upfront commitments. Typically, the
commitments for the fourth quarter of the current year are considered ‘firm’ buys,
whereas advertisers may cancel about 25% of the upfront commitments for the first
quarter of the following year, and 50% for the second and third quarters. Histori-
cally, advertisers have not aggressively exercised this option, with cancellations only
running between 10% and 15% (Wang et al. (2009)). Last, multi-year contracts may
be associated with sporting events and event sponsorships. These practices do not
directly affect the price determination process in the upfront market.
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3 Data
The data for the project come from three sources: Rentrak Corporation, SQAD,
and Kantar Media’s Ad$pender.13 In the television market, Rentrak collects viewer-
ship (i.e., ratings) data from over 13 million households and 29 million set-top cable
boxes.14 The demographic detail covers over 100 standard demographic variables for
all members of each household (for example, gender, race, education, income, etc.).
Rentrak combines these viewership data with information on ad placements. The
information about each advertisement is extensive, describing the advertiser, indus-
try, product, ad copy, timing, and placement of each ad (for example, Coca-Cola
ran the 30-second “Let the World Come to Your Home" ad for Coca-Cola Classic
during the 8:00pm showing of “16 and Pregnant" on MTV at 8:13:30pm on Tuesday,
October 6, 2013, which was the third of four ads shown in the second ad break of
that telecast). The Rentrak data also contain information on the corporate relation-
ships across advertisers, identifying parent companies for brands across products in
different industries.
Prices of ad spots are closely guarded by industry participants and are notoriously
difficult to observe. SQAD is the sole provider of data on the prices that result from
these transactions.15 These transaction-level data, which SQAD calls ‘NetCosts,’
report the average transaction price for an ad spot in a specific telecast (for example,
“16 and Pregnant" on MTV, shown at 8:00pm on Tuesday, October 6, 2013). The
data contain information on reported prices separately for the upfront and scatter
markets.
Information on the length of relationship between a parent company and a network
is obtained from Ad$pender. Ad$pender collects information on advertising expen-
13After we collected the data for our analysis, Rentrak merged with ComScore.
14Unlike the Neilsen Company, which tracks 25,000 households using a ‘PeopleMeter’ to monitor
which member of a household is viewing a telecast, Rentrak collects data for a much larger population
at the level of each ‘tune-in’ of a remote control, but does not identify which household member is
viewing a given telecast.
15In order to solve the information revelation problem, the transaction prices are reported as an
average transaction price for telecasts for which advertisers from at least two agencies purchased a
spot.
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ditures for more than 3 million brands across media outlets: broadcast television,
cable television, radio, magazines, and newspapers. The data include information on
advertising expenditures starting in 1995, allowing us to track the length of a parent
company’s presence in the broadcast advertising market.
The final sample includes three years of pricing and detailed advertising data:
January 2011 - December 2013. We focus the analysis on 30 networks for which we
observe price, demographic information, and ad placements. These networks include
the five broadcasters (ABC, CBS, CW, FOX, and NBC), and 25 cable networks.
The cable networks are grouped into conglomerates according to their ownership
structure during the sample period: Disney-ABC (ABC Family), ESPN (ESPN),
Disney-ABC/Hearst Corporation (A&E, History, Lifetime), AMC Networks (AMC),
Comcast (Bravo, MSNBC, Syfy, USA), Discovery Communications (Animal Planet,
Discovery, TLC), Fox Entertainment Group (FX, Fox News), Scripps Networks (Food
Network, HGTV, Travel Channel), Time Warner (CNN, TBS, TNT, TruTV), Viacom
(BET, MTV, Spike).
We focus our analysis on firms’ advertising choices in primetime programming.
Primetime refers to the 8-11:00p.m. block of television programming; most televi-
sion viewership and advertising expenditures are concentrated in primetime. Firms’
primetime advertising reflects their ad-placement choices, while ad placements in non-
prime time may be the result of audience deficiency guarantees. Large advertisers are
the main participants in the upfront market. As a result, we focus on ad placements
in primetime programming by large advertisers.
The final sample contains information on 95,472 unique telecasts (i.e., a program
airing) and the input-sourcing advertising choices of 320 advertisers. These advertisers
account for 80% of national television primetime advertisements during the sample
period. An advertiser is defined at the brand level, and these 320 advertisers represent
191 unique parent companies. For example, the parent company Toyota Motor Corp
owns three advertisers in the data: Lexus, Scion, and Toyota.
The information from Ad$pender allows us to construct a variable to track the
length of parent company participation in the broadcast upfront market. Base rates
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are determined at the parent level and all brands of a parent company receive the
same base rate. We use the Ad$pender data from 1995 and 1996 to determine whether
a parent company has an established relationship with a broadcaster at the beginning
of Ad$pender’s sample. We define the year in which a company entered the broadcast
upfront market as the first year in which we observe the parent company advertising
in broadcast television, combined with 2 additional assumptions: 1. there are no gaps
in spending greater than a year; 2. the broadcast spending by the company places
in the top 90% of parent companies advertising in broadcast. We follow the same
strategy to identify the year in which a firm entered the cable upfront market.
Data show that 56% of the parent companies have established relationships with
a broadcaster at the beginning of Ad$pender’s sample, and we can track the entry of
the remaining companies. Table 2.1 summarizes the inferred year in which a parent
company has an established relationship in the broadcast or cable network market.
For 75% of the parent companies, the inferred entry in the broadcast and cable upfront
market is the same. For most other companies, we infer that the parent company has
longer uninterrupted relationships in the cable advertising market.
Ad$pender aggregates the information across all broadcasters and across all cable
networks; thus, we can only infer when a parent company purchases ads from any
broadcaster (or cable network), rather than the exact identities of the networks. The
implicit assumption is that if a company’s spending is significant for the broadcast (or
cable) market, then the company purchases ads in the upfront and it advertises nn
all broadcast (or cable) networks. We can confirm the plausibility of this assumption
for the observed sample period using Rentrak data. On average, parent companies
advertise in 24 of the 30 networks in a year. For the set of companies that advertise
on broadcast, data show that, on average, they advertise in 3.8 of the 5 broadcasters,
where the variation is created by the choice of whether or not to advertise on CW.
In 64% of the ‘parent company’-year observations, we see that parent companies
advertise in all broadcasters’ primetime programming.
Table 2.1 shows the variation in advertiser (brand) annual spending from Ad$pender.
The average advertiser budget in the 5 broadcast networks is $49.7 million, while
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cable companies capture $39.1 million per advertiser. The analysis focuses on prime-
time advertising, which constitutes 64% of advertisers’ annual spending in broadcast
television (35% for cable networks). During the sample period, national television
advertising constitutes, on average, 77% of firms’ total advertising spending. The
other media outlets tracked by Ad$pender capture firms’ ad spending online, on the
radio, in newspapers, and magazines.16 We evaluate the match between our data
sources by comparing the annual primetime spending reported in Ad$pender with
primetime spending constructed using average prices from SQAD and ad placements
from Rentrak. The correlation between the two variables is 0.98, which confirms the
match between our data sources.
To study firms’ input-sourcing choices across different programming options, we
rely on industry practices to define what constitutes a ‘product’ in the upfront mar-
ket for national television advertising. The product purchased in this input market
is the viewers reached through an ad, and its main characteristics are the size and
demographic profile of viewership. In addition, the upfront market is characterized by
block-buying. That is, advertisers purchase a programming mix rather than selecting
ad placements in individual telecasts. We approximate this practice by aggregating
telecasts into products using information on audience size and viewers’ demographic
composition.17 We use a flexible clustering algorithm called affinity propagation de-
scribed in detail in Appendix 2.A. The algorithm is run separately for each network
conglomerate, using all viewer demographic variables to create clusters of similar
shows.
The clusters help us aggregate the data in a meaningful way from the advertiser’s
perspective. Most previous analyses of the television market focus on viewers’ choice
of programing. Given that a consumer may watch only one telecast at a time, a
timeline is typically introduced in these approaches. In contrast, we study firms’
choices of advertising inputs, where the common currency is viewership. Thus, the
16The online spending reported in Ad$pender includes only display advertising; search and broad-
band video are not included.
17The product definition also helps to resolve the dimensionality issues presented by the number of
telecasts. The sample includes more than 2,600 telecasts for each month for each of the 30 networks.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
mean sd med min max
broadcast relationship 2000 5.3 1996 1996 2011
cable relationship 1999 4.6 1996 1996 2011
Annual Advertiser Spending ($ millions)
national broadcast TV 70.4 97.8 33.2 0.0 694.2
national broadcast TV, prime time 44.5 65.7 18.8 0.0 485.2
national cable TV 54.9 59.3 31.4 0.0 397.8
national cable TV, prime time 20.8 23.6 12.0 0.0 157.1
online 16.0 30.0 4.6 0.0 229.6
magazine 22.4 45.6 6.5 0.0 457.0
newspapers 2.2 5.3 0.0 0.0 53.1
radio 1.4 3.8 0.0 0.0 31.2
Product Definition
# of telecasts (cluster) 23.3 19.4 18 1 94
# of clusters (conglomerate) 8.7 4.1 7 2 22
ratings 0.018 0.020 0.009 0.001 0.144
ratings (s.d. within cluster) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.014
Product Definition Demographics
male (single) 0.93 0.25 0.93 0.39 3.61
female (single) 0.94 0.27 0.94 0.41 3.29
age 18-24 1.09 0.20 1.06 0.56 1.80
age 65+ 0.93 0.31 0.91 0.31 1.96
$100,000+ 0.97 0.15 0.96 0.64 1.71
African American 1.06 0.29 0.99 0.55 2.49
Hispanic 0.86 0.34 0.77 0.39 2.51
Asian American 0.62 0.20 0.60 0.17 1.59
Advertiser Choices Across Clusters
number of clusters (month) 42.1 26.9 38.0 1.0 122.0
number of ads in a cluster (month) 3.3 2.6 2.7 0.3 52.4
Advertiser spending (in millions) estimates and length of relationship are obtained from Ad$pender. The other
variables are constructed using Rentrak data.
relevant characteristics of a product describe the audience size and types of viewers
who may be reached through an ad.
The algorithm defines approximately 130 clusters (products) each month. For a
given month, the telecasts of a network conglomerate are grouped into, on average, 9
clusters. The second panel of table 2.1 shows that a cluster combines information from
23.3 telecasts, on average. To create the ratings and demographic profiles of these
products, we use the information of the “exemplar" telecast, which is the telecast
that best describes the cluster to which it belongs. Cluster ratings measure the
size of the audience reached by a program. The average cluster rating is 0.018, which
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suggests that the “exemplar" telecast of that cluster reached approximately 1.8 million
households.
Television programming is diverse, and different shows appeal to different types
of viewers. This is reflected in the demographic summary statistics across clusters in
table 2.1. These indices measure the relative viewership of households with a specific
demographic, compared to the viewership of all households with that demographic
across the rest of the available programming. For example, if the male demographic
index of a cluster is greater than 1, then this implies that the exemplar of that cluster
attracts a disproportionate share of males relative to other telecasts airing at the
same time. The demographic variables capture viewing by households, rather than
the behavior of each member within the household. As a result, we use male (single)
and female (single) demographics to describe the viewership patterns across gender.
Table 2.1 also shows summary statistics on advertisers’ choices within a month.
Data show that advertisers typically reach consumers in different programs. On
average, an advertiser shows ads in 42.1 clusters (out of approximately 130 options),
and conditional on advertising in a cluster, the average number of ads sent is 3.3.
4 Reduced-form analysis
Industry narratives suggest that there are large differences in the prices paid by dif-
ferent companies to reach the same audience, and that these differences are related to
the length of the relationship between a firm and a network. Contractual agreements
are closely guarded; hence, there are no reliable data that may directly identify the
size of the grandfathered discounts. To our knowledge, the only study that relies on
actual prices faced by different firms was published in 2005 by MPMA, an auditor of
media spending in the U.S. The report documents that the spread in upfront prices
can be as large as 50% and that the spread is not associated with firm size (Bloom
(2005)). As a consequence, our first step is to check for data patterns that would
suggest the presence of price differentials that are associated with the legacy status
of a firm. In particular, we ask the following question: do companies with longer
relationships with broadcasters advertise disproportionately more on broadcast than
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on cable networks?
Ideally, we would check whether a firm reaches disproportionately more viewers
in a network when it has a longer historic relationship with that network. How-
ever, the Ad$pender data aggregate spending information to the level of ‘broadcast
spending’ and ‘cable spending.’ The three major broadcasters (ABC, CBS, and NBC)
established the upfront market in the 1960s. FOX enters the broadcast (and upfront)
market in 1986, and CW in 2006. Broadcasters have been consistently selling approx-
imately 80% of their prime-time programming during the upfront. In contrast, cable
companies gradually enter the upfront starting in the 1990s and currently sell about
50% of their inventories during the upfront. These industry facts suggest that legacy
discounts characterize the market for broadcast advertising and are of less importance
for national cable advertising. Thus, the reduced-form analysis provides evidence of
legacy discounts in the market for broadcast advertising relative to cable advertising.
Grandfathered rates depend on the parent company (P&G) rather than the ad-
vertiser (Tide). A parent company is defined as legacy if it advertised on broadcast in
1995 and 1996 as well as having no gap in spending greater than a year. The analysis
compares the input-sourcing choices of legacy companies to those of companies that
begin advertising with any broadcaster after 1996 (non-legacy firms). Even though a
parent company faces a single price, it may have different advertising objectives across
product categories. For example, P&G’s brands span cleaning products (e.g. Tide),
hair products (e.g. Head & Shoulders), non-prescription drugs (e.g. Dayquil), etc.
These brands may target customers with different demographic profiles, while facing
the same prices at the upfront. As a result, the unit of observation is constructed
at the ‘parent-category-month’ level. This allows us to control for differences in the
target audiences across product categories within the same parent company.
We measure advertising intensity on broadcast as the fraction of primetime viewers
reached on broadcast networks. For each firm, the variable tracks the total number
of primetime ads (weighted by ratings) shown on broadcast divided by the total
number of primetime ads purchased in any of the tracked networks for the month.
Table 2.2 shows that, on average, 45% of a firm’s viewers are reached on broadcast
68
programming.
If we find that legacy firms place a larger share of their ads in broadcast than
non-legacy firms, these differences can be attributed to several factors:
1. the relative cost of advertising on broadcast networks is lower for legacy firms,
2. the relative value of the viewers reached on broadcast networks is higher for
legacy firms,
3. the relative value of broadcast advertising depends on total advertising spending
(and is correlated with the legacy status of the firm),
4. the relative value of broadcast programming (not captured through viewers’
demographics) is higher for legacy firms,
5. the relative value of broadcast advertising depends on firm ‘strategies’ between
television and digital advertising (and is correlated with the legacy status of the
firm).
In order to assert that the first explanation is driving the results, we must take
into account the other confounding factors. The reduced-form analysis compares
firm input-sourcing choices in prime time to isolate comparable advertising inputs.
However, advertising in broadcast and cable primetime programs may be imperfect
substitutes because these media reach different audiences. To account for potential
differences in the target audiences across legacy and non-legacy firms, we repeat the
analysis for separate demographic variables described in table 2.2. In particular, we
use demographics on gender, age, income, and race, and then test whether legacy
firms reach a larger fraction of viewers (with that demographic profile) in broadcast
than firms that have entered the broadcast advertising market after 1996.
Next, we control for parent company advertising expenditure, using the log of total
advertising spending across all media outlets from Ad$pender. This variable controls
for the possibility that firms with large advertising expenditures may have different
payoffs from advertising in broadcast vis-a-vis cable. The control also captures the
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possibility that parents with large advertising expenditures may negotiate lower base
rates irrespective of year of entry. We will not distinguish between the two rationales
given the data available. However, as the MPMA report concludes that scale is not
a key factor for prices, one may interpret the variable as a control for the correlation
between firm advertising budgets and the benefit to advertising on broadcast. Table
2.2 summarizes this variable separately for legacy and non-legacy parent companies.
The difference in spending is driven by differences in the number of brands produced
by legacy firms. Data show that legacy firms often produce multiple brands within
the same product category, while the pattern is not as prominent for non-legacy firms.
To address the confounding factor in (4.), we include category fixed effects. The
analysis compares firms’ advertising choices within an industry, separating firms by
their legacy status. That is, we allow for category-specific unobserved benefits of
reaching a viewer on broadcast (rather than cable). For example, the benefits from
advertising on broadcast might differ between cleaning products and non-prescription
drugs. This controls for the fact that legacy and non-legacy firms may be coming from
different industries. Last, firms may have different strategies between television and
digital advertising, so we include the share of digital advertising (as a fraction of total
advertiser spending) as a control.
The confounding factors above raise the concern that legacy firms are different
from non-legacy firms. If such unobservable differences are correlated with firms’
returns to advertising on broadcast relative to cable in a way that is not captured
by advertiser category, advertising budget, digital spending, and demographics, then
the results presented below will be biased. The identifying assumption is that any
remaining unobservable benefits to advertising on broadcast are independent of the
length of relationship of a parent company in the broadcast market.
Another concern arises because firms make input-sourcing choices based on ex-
pected viewership, while our data track the actual demographic profile of a telecast.
We assume that such differences affect all advertisers in the same way and these are
not correlated with the legacy status of the firm.
The analysis asks whether the proportion of viewers reached in broadcast versus
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Table 2.2: Reduced-form Variables
mean sd med min max
dependent variables
viewers reached in broadcast (fraction) 0.45 0.30 0.51 0.00 1.00
male (single) 0.43 0.29 0.48 0.00 1.00
female (single) 0.46 0.30 0.54 0.00 1.00
age 18-24 0.43 0.29 0.48 0.00 1.00
age 55-64 0.46 0.30 0.53 0.00 1.00
$100,000+ 0.47 0.30 0.54 0.00 1.00
African American 0.41 0.28 0.46 0.00 1.00
Hispanic 0.41 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Asian American 0.45 0.30 0.51 0.00 1.00
controls
adv. expenditure (millions) 15.82 18.66 8.78 0.00 160.05
adv. expenditure (legacy,millions) 18.22 20.49 10.60 0.00 160.05
adv. expenditure (non-legacy, millions) 11.11 13.19 6.76 0.00 117.85
share of digital adv. 0.09 0.14 0.04 0.00 1.00
share of digital adv. (legacy) 0.09 0.13 0.04 0.00 1.00
share of digital adv. (non-legacy) 0.11 0.16 0.05 0.00 1.00
Advertiser spending estimates and length of relationship are obtained from Ad$pender.
cable networks varies with the legacy status of the parent company. Table 2.3 presents
the results using all viewers to construct the dependent variable. Then, table 2.4
extends the results by comparing firm advertising choices across different demographic
groups. The first row shows the variable of interest, and all regressions suggest that
legacy firms reach a larger fraction of viewers on broadcast. Table 2.3 shows that
the results do not change across specifications, which differ in the controls used. In
columns (1) to (3) we add in each control one at a time: parent adverting expenditure,
share of online advertising, and category fixed effects. The main specification is
included in column (4) and it includes all controls.
The last column in table 2.3 repeats the analysis using data only for the last
quarter of each year (September to December). In the upfront market firms pur-
chase advertising portfolios in advance for the following season (purchase in June for
advertising beginning in September). As a result, the contracts allow that some of
the buys for January-June in the following year are ‘optionable.’ By repeating the
reduced-form analysis for the part of the sample with ‘firm’ buys, we confirm that
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the patterns in the data are not driven by differences in demand volatility between
legacy and non-legacy firms.
We also check the robustness of these results using viewer demographics to con-
struct the dependent variable, and these results are reported in table 2.4. The first
column replicates the results from table 2.3 using total ads weighted by ratings to con-
struct the fraction of viewers reached on broadcast. The remaining columns use total
ads weighted by both ratings and demographic indices to construct the dependent
variable. Note that regressions may differ across demographics if the viewers watching
broadcast programing have different demographic profiles from those watching cable
networks. We find that the results are consistent across demographic profiles. Given
this suggestive evidence, we proceed with a structural analysis that carefully models
advertiser input-sourcing decisions.
Table 2.3: Model-free Evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
legacy firm=1 0.126∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013)
firm adv. expenditure 0.059∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
share of online adv. -0.230∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.054)
constant 0.444∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.046) (0.014) (0.052) (0.085)
month & year FE yes yes yes yes yes
industry FE no no no yes yes
observations 7678 7678 7678 7678 2618
adjusted R2 0.050 0.113 0.062 0.259 0.249
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The dependent variable in all regressions is the fraction of viewers reached in broadcast television. An observation is
defined at the parent-category-month level.
5 Model
The model considers how firms use heterogeneous advertising inputs for the produc-
tion of the final product sold to consumers. We focus on the careful analysis of firms’
72
Table 2.4: Model-free Evidence
views male female age 18-24 age 65+ $100,000+ African Hispanic Asian
(single) (single) Am. Am.
legacy firm=1 0.085∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
firm adv. expenditure 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
share of online adv. -0.229∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
constant -0.431∗∗∗ -0.398∗∗∗ -0.475∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗
month & year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
observations 7678 7678 7678 7678 7678 7678 7678 7678 7678
adjusted R2 0.259 0.253 0.262 0.255 0.264 0.266 0.239 0.252 0.255
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
The dependent variable in the first regressions is the fraction of viewers reached in broadcast television. The other
regressions use the fraction of viewers with a specific demographic profile (by gender, age, and race) reached in
broadcast. An observation is defined at the parent-category-month level.
choices to reach different audiences and the outlets selected to reach these viewers.18
The model imposes that these decisions are non-strategic, as if firms operate in sep-
arate markets.
To define a product, we use the clustering algorithm described in Section 3. The
approach combines telecasts into clusters using the demographic profile of viewers
reached. This definition approximates the block-buying practice in the upfront mar-
ket, and decreases the dimensionality of the problem, while preserving the variation
in viewership characteristics across inputs.19
The market for national television advertising provides access to differentiated
advertising inputs, that is, they may reach different viewers when advertising in dif-
ferent clusters. Thus, we consider two clusters with different demographic profiles as
imperfect substitutes in the production of the final product sold to consumers. Pat-
terns in the data reveal that firms typically show ads in multiple, but not necessarily
all, clusters, and they often purchase several ad slots within the same cluster. As a
result, we model firms’ advertising payoffs with a function that accommodates mul-
18Advertising agencies select the advertising mix separately for each of their clients. The implicit
assumption is that an agency maximizes the payoffs of each of its clients separately. We do not ob-
serve information on advertiser-agency relationships, and advertisers may employ several ad agencies
to manage different ad campaigns. Industry practitioners confirm that the interests of advertising
agencies and their clients are aligned.
19The model does not account for specific ad scheduling within a cluster. These choices may be
important for the advertiser; however, such scheduling occurs months after the upfront market, and
as a result, they do not provide information about advertising costs.
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tiple discreteness and diminishing marginal returns to an input (advertising within
the same cluster). Specifically, we borrow from the Multiple Discrete-Continuous Ex-
treme Value literature (MDCEV, see Bhat (2008)). The model imposes that firms
choose their advertising mix by maximizing payoffs subject to a budget constraint.





((qij + 1)αj − 1)
αj
(2.1)
where qij is the number of ads that firm i shows to viewers of cluster j.20 The αj
parameters govern firms’ diminishing marginal returns to advertising in the same
cluster. This implies that the value of showing an ad to the same (or similar) viewers
may decrease with repetition. If all αj = 1, then the payoff function exhibits constant
marginal returns. In this case, the model collapses to a standard discretechoice setup,
where a payoff-maximizing firm will show ads only in the cluster(s) with the highest
marginal benefit per dollar. Alternatively, as αj → 0, the function collapses to
log(qij + 1). We refer to αj as the diminishing returns parameters.
Firm i’s payoff from using advertising input j is modeled by ψij = exp(Xijβi+εij),
where the ψij term captures firm i’s value of reaching the audience of cluster j. To
see this, suppose that the payoff function exhibits constant marginal returns (αj = 1
for ∀j), then ψij tracks firm i’s marginal benefits from advertising in cluster j. If
firm i may choose between two inputs j and k (with unit prices, pj = pk = 1) and
ψij > ψik, then firm i will choose to advertise in j. We describe this valuation with
observable characteristics of firms and advertising inputs, Xij, and an idiosyncratic
shock, εij. The shock is modeled as i.i.d. extreme value type I error with mean of zero
and variance of σ2. We refer to the parameters guiding ψ as base value parameters.
The payoff function takes into account that firms may use other media outlets to
reach consumers, and this is captured through an outside option, j = 0. Similarly to
discrete-choice models, the base valuation of the outside option is normalized to zero,
that is, Xi0βi + εi0 = εi0; and its price is set to 1.
20We model advertisers’ choices of programming mix for each month separately. Month subscripts
are omitted for readability.
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To complete the optimization problem, we impose that firm i’s advertising expen-
diture may not exceed its advertising budget, Bi. The expenditure captures spending
on national television combined with online, radio, newspapers, or outdoors advertis-




(qijpij) + qi0p0 (2.2)
where prices to advertise in primetime may vary by firm. As described in Section
2, these prices are described in terms of CPM costs and firms may have different
discounts with respect to these CPM values: pij = audiencejCPMij. So the budget




(qij(audiencejCPMij)) + qi0. (2.3)
In this project we focus on understanding price differentials in the upfront market.
As a result, we carefully analyze firms’ input-sourcing choices of national television
advertising. Firm strategic interactions in the product market and general economic
conditions may influence firm decisions about the value of audience demographics
and total advertising spending. However, we do not observe data on outcomes in
the final-goods market, thus, the setup abstracts from interactions in the product
market and takes overall television advertising budgets and demographic preferences
as exogenous to the model.
The structure imposed on the payoff function allows us to decrease the dimension-
ality of the problem and makes estimation feasible. An alternative approach would
be to find the payoff-maximizing “bundle" of programming without a functional-form
assumption. This requires that we populate all possible bundles of clusters that a firm
may choose. This approach is not well-suited in our setting for two reasons. First,
we are modeling ’ firms’ choice across more than 100 clusters, which creates a di-
mensionality problem for the bundling approach. Second, a bundling approach would
focus on the identities of the clusters in which a firm advertises and it will ignore any
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important information contained in the quantity choice. That is, it will impose that
the marginal benefit from airing a second ad in a cluster is zero. Our approach allows
us to take into account the discrete-continuous nature of the advertiser’s problem in
a tractable manner.
5.1 Likelihood function
Below we derive the likelihood function that reflects firms’ optimal programming mix.
Given the payoff function and the budget constraint defined in equations 1 and 3,











where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with firms’ budget constraints. The
optimization problem allows that firms may purchase any combination of products.
Thus we have the standard set of first order conditions (FOC) that depend on whether
or not the product is purchased. If the product is purchased and the firm chooses to
advertise in a cluster (j ∈ [0, Ai]), then the first order condition holds with equality.
On the other hand if the firms chooses not to advertise in a cluster (k /∈ [0, Ai]), then
the conditions hold with an inequality. These first order conditions are given by
exp((Xijβi + εij))
priceij
(qij + 1)αj−1 − λ = 0, if j ∈ [0, Ai] (i.e. qij > 0)
exp((Xikβi + εik))
priceik
(qik + 1)αk−1 − λ < 0, if k /∈ Ai (i.e. qik = 0)
(2.5)
The first order conditions ensure that advertisers are buying products with the highest
marginal utility per dollar. To see this assume some product 0 is always purchased
and substitute in for λ to get the follow familiar equations that govern marginal rates




(qij + 1)αj−1 =
exp(Xi0βi + εi0)
price0
(qi0 + 1)α0−1, if j ∈ Ai (i.e. qij > 0)
exp(Xikβi + εik)
priceik
(qik + 1)αk−1 <
exp(Xi0βi + εi0)
price0
(qi0 + 1)α0−1, if k /∈ Ai (i.e. qik = 0).
(2.6)
In order to simplify the above equations, we take logs and define Vij as below:
Vij = [(Xijβi) + (αj − 1) log(qij + 1)]− log(priceij) (2.7)
We can now rewrite the Kuhn Tucker (KT) conditions by substituting in V to obtain
Vij + σεij = Vi0 + σεi0 if j ∈ [0, Ai]
Vik + σεik < Vi0 + σεi0 if j /∈ Ai
(2.8)
To complete the model we must specify the error structure. We skip the derivation
of a general error structure21 and instead specify an extreme value distribution for
εk and assume εk is independent of Xk. We also assume the εk are independently
distributed across alternatives with a scale parameter of σ. This assumption on the
error term allows for a closed-form solution for the probability that an advertiser
allocates expenditure to goods 0 to Ai.




























where υ is the standard extreme value density function and Υ is the standard extreme
value cumulative distribution function. As shown in Bhat (2008) the Jacobian |J | has
the following closed form solution













Using this closed form of the Jacobian and integrating Equation 2.9 we can obtain a
closed form expression of the probabilities










(M − 1)! (2.11)
The expression above highlights that this model is just a discrete continuous choice
extension of the multinomial logit model. To confirm, just set α = 1, such that
there are no diminishing returns to advertising in a cluster, and assume only a single
product is purchased (Ai = 0), then the model collapses to the standard multinomial
logit model.
6 Estimation and identification
The empirical analysis uses firms’ advertising choices to infer information about the
relative prices paid to reach viewers in a specific programming cluster. Such price dif-
ferentials are prevalent in the upfront markets, where broadcast networks sell approx-
imately 80% of their inventory. Only firms with relatively large advertising budgets
participate in the upfront. As a result, the analysis uses data on the ad-placement
choices of the top 191 parent companies.22 The decision-making agent is defined at
the ‘parent company’-category level, and for the remaining of the paper we refer to
this level of data aggregation as the advertiser.
Advertisers may reach customers through other media outlets as well. Firms
may also rely on online, radio, newspapers, outdoors, or non-primetime cable ad-
vertisements. Thus, the outside option is defined as total spending in those media
alternatives. We use data from Ad$pender to construct the monthly expenditure by
22A firm’s decision of whether to participate in the upfront or to wait for the scatter market may
have interesting implications; however, we cannot recover from the data how ad slots are purchased.
The implicit assumption in the estimation is that legacy firms with large advertising budgets purchase
primetime programming during the upfront.
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advertiser, summarized in table 3.
Firms’ choices across heterogeneous advertising inputs depend on four sets of
parameters: those governing the base valuations (β), diminishing returns (α), the
variance of the extreme value shocks (σ), and the coefficient of interest, introduced
below, the legacy discount (δ). We first describe the parametrization approach, then
we discuss the identification strategy.
The base valuation parameters capture firms’ value of reach viewers in different
clusters. To account for the size and demographic composition of the audience, we in-
clude household ratings and variables tracking whether a larger fraction of individuals
with each of these characteristics is reached in that cluster: single female, presence
of someone in the 18 to 24 age group, the presence of someone above 65 years of
age, households with income over $100,000, and race variables (African American,
Hispanic, and Asian American). Additional controls include genre, network con-
glomerate fixed effects, advertiser category fixed effects, and month-year dummies to
capture seasonality changes.
Advertisers spread their ad budgets across a range of programming clusters, which






which imposes that αj ∈ (0, 1]. For all television advertising clusters, we allow that αj
depends on the number of hours of programming combined in that cluster. Showing
an additional ad in a specific cluster j has two effects. First, there may be marginal
benefits of showing one more ad to the same viewers. Second, the additional ad
may reach a different subset of viewers, as clusters combine multiple telecasts. We
interpret the parameters governing the number of hours in a telecast as a proxy to
the second effect. We estimate a separate α0 for the outside option.
In the upfront market for national television advertising, firms purchase “access"
to viewers and the cost to reach these viewers varies across firms. The variation in
prices across firms is typically associated with the length of relationship between the
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firm and the network. Prices paid by new businesses have been consistently higher
than those faced by returning businesses, which has established the difference between
legacy and non-legacy prices. Unfortunately we do not observe individual firm prices.
Instead, we allow that the prices faced by legacy and non-legacy firms to advertise
on broadcast differ. We model the cost to firm i to reach the viewers of cluster j as
priceij = audiencejCPMij = audiencejCPMj exp(δblegacy). (2.13)
The exponential functional form ensures that prices are positive. The discount pa-
rameter, δblegacy, allows that legacy firms benefit from lower prices in the broadcast
advertising market. To match industry practices, the legacy discount is defined at
the parent-company level, such that δblegacy = 1 if the parent-company has entered
the broadcast upfront market prior to 1996 and cluster j is aired on a broadcast
network. Thus, this parameter captures the relative price differences paid by legacy
and non-legacy firms to advertise on broadcast rather than on cable.
The discount estimate does not change over time, which implies that relative price
differences across broadcast and cable are preserved. This is consistent with industry
practices, as prices in the upfront market adjust as uniform percentage changes. The
implicit assumption is that, during our sample, all broadcast (and all cable) networks
secured similar percent increases.
We acknowledge that the structure of the payoff function will play a role in the
identification and interpretation of our parameter estimates. Below, we present an
informal identification argument to highlight the variation in the data that drives the
identification of each set of parameters.
In our setup, we observe both firms’ choices of where and how much to advertise.
The extensive margin of this choice (where to advertise) identifies the base parameters,
while the intensive margin (how much to advertise) informs the diminishing returns
parameters. First, variation in firms’ programming mix pins down the base value
parameters. These parameters depend only on the set of clusters selected and the
intuition for the identification of these parameters is similar to standard discrete-
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choice arguments. Suppose that an advertiser may choose between showing one ad
in two clusters with the same prices, she will choose to advertise in the cluster with
the higher base value. As a result, if data suggest that firms are more likely to show
ads in, for example, clusters appealing to younger audiences, then the estimation
would infer that firms value reaching young viewers. Second, the diminishing returns
parameters are identified through firms’ decisions to allocate their budgets across the
set of selected clusters. Consider a firm that sends ads in two clusters with the same
base value parameters and prices. Differences in the number of ads placed in each
cluster pins down the diminishing returns parameters.
Similarly to standard discrete-choice logit models, the base value and price esti-
mates are scaled by the variance of the extreme-value shock; that is, all valuation
parameters are β/σ and the price parameter equals 1/σ. As a result, σ is identified
through variation in average prices across clusters.
This paper focuses on documenting the presence of legacy discounts. The discount
estimation exploits variation in the advertising mix between broadcast and cable net-
works across legacy and non-legacy advertisers. Conditional on ratings, demographics
and other controls added in X, the discount parameter captures the difference in the
likelihood that a legacy firm purchases advertising inputs from broadcasters.
Similarly to most empirical applications, we are faced with two concerns about
prices: price endogeneity and measurement error. We observe data on average prices
paid in the upfront market. These average prices may differ across telecasts according
to the size of the audience reached, the demographic profile of the audience, the
network, or some idiosyncratic characteristics of the telecast. We combine telecasts
into clusters using detailed information on viewership, and the parameterization takes
into account the fact that firms are able to reach different viewer profiles in different
clusters. We also capture unobserved firm valuations from different networks and
genres using fixed effects. Nevertheless, it is possible that reaching a young person in
ABC is more valuable to advertisers than reaching a young person in A&E. This might
be because the advertiser reaches different subsets of young people in these shows,
or because the level of engagement differs across networks. The results presented
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assume that conditional on observables, any remaining unobservable components are
not correlated with prices. We are working on extending the parameterization to
capture advertisers’ valuations more flexibly.
7 Results and interpretation
Below we discuss the parameter estimates of the advertiser payoff function. To inter-
pret the legacy discount parameter, we use a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation
that showcases the benefits from a legacy status with respect to efficiency gains from
a merger.
Table 2.5 shows the results from two specifications that differ in the parametriza-
tion of the diminishing returns parameters, α. In the first column we allow that the
return to sending an additional ad in a cluster of primetime programming depends
on the number of hours of programming combined in the cluster. The specification
also estimates a separate diminishing returns value for the outside option. Results
show that αj = 11+exp(17.17−3.02∗log(hours of programming)) , thus
∂αj
∂hours of programming > 0. This
is in line with our intuition that an additional ad in a cluster with many hours of
programming may reach different subsets of viewers, so these inputs experience lower
levels of diminishing returns (higher αj). More importantly, the estimates suggest
that the α parameters are close to zero for all primetime clusters. For example, the
average cluster combines 18 hours of programming and this suggests that αj = .0004,
and the αj for the largest clusters is 0.013. For the outside option, we get α0 = 0.02.
Given these results, we estimate a specification imposing that αj → 0 and α0 → 0. In
this case, the payoff function collapses to ∑j∈[0,Ai] exp(Xijβi+εij) log(qij +1). The re-
sults are reported in the second column of table 2.5. The remainder of the discussion
focuses on the results from this estimation.
Instead of normalizing the variance of the extreme value shock to 1, we estimate
the σ parameter. In effect, this value determined the price coefficient for an advertiser,
and it equals 11.17 = 0.85. Note that the base valuation parameters described below
are scaled by the variance estimate as well.
The base value parameters reflect the payoffs to advertising in clusters with dif-
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results of MDCEV Model
(1) (2)







female (single) -0.083 -0.084
(.012) (0.011)
age 18-24 0.765 0.764
(0.031) (0.024)
age 65+ -0.210 -0.211
(0.019) (0.020)




Asian American -0.337 -0.337
(0.014) (0.012)
α constant 17.175 -
(0.015) -
α log(hours of programming) -3.024 -
(0.243) -
α broadcaster 40.853 -
(0.012) -
α outside option 3.809 -
(0.138) -





month FE Yes Yes
category FE Yes Yes
genre FE Yes Yes
conglomerate FE Yes Yes
Standard errors in parenthesis
ferent characteristics. The positive coefficient on ratings confirms that firms value
advertising on clusters that reach more viewers. The coefficients on the demographic
indices reflect how firms value the demographic mix of viewership. For example, the
positive coefficients on viewers with income over $100,000 and viewers who are 18 to
24 years of age indicate that firms prefer advertising in clusters that reach a dispro-
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portionate share of those demographics. Alternatively, results imply that advertisers
value less, shows that have an above average number of viewers over the age of 65.
Note that the estimation uses a restricted set of demographics, as reported in table 2.5
because of high correlations between different demographic variables. For example,
the correlation between viewers who are over 65 and those who are between the ages
of 35-44 is -0.91. Thus, the negative coefficient on the demographic tracking viewers
over 65 suggests that advertisers value placing advertisements in shows with lower
concentrations of viewers over 65 years old.
We also include controls for network conglomerate, genre, advertiser category, and
time period. As expected, we find that firms value more, the advertising inputs that
are obtained from broadcast rather than cable networks, where ABC is the most
preferred network in our data and A&E is the least. In terms of genre, results suggest
that firms receive higher payoffs from advertising in action/adventure programming
followed by reality, with the news genre being the least attractive.
The legacy discount estimates are negative. These suggest that a firm with long
relationship in the broadcast market captures a 7.9% discount when advertising on
broadcast relative to potential cable discounts.23
To evaluate the size of this discount, we perform a simple partial equilibrium
calculation to quantify the dollar value of the differences between legacy and non-
legacy firms. The exercise keeps average prices and firm programming mix fixed and
calculates the cost savings to a firm if it changes its status from non-legacy to legacy.
This type of adjustment may happen if, for example, a non-legacy firm merges with
a legacy firm. In that case, the new firm will face the lower prices. The back-of-the-
envelope calculation implies that the average non-legacy firm would save $2 million
annually if the legacy discount applied to its advertising campaigns.
Another way to characterize these cost savings is to calculate the additional im-
pressions (views that are not necessarily unique) the merged firm may purchase with-
23The legacy discount enters the price determination in a multiplicative way; as a result, its role
in the indirect ‘utility’ function of a firm is analogous to a dummy variable identifying a legacy firm
advertising in broadcast primetime programming. Hence, another interpretation of that variable is
that legacy firms obtain higher payoffs from advertising on broadcast relative to cable networks. We
present the preferred interpretation of the parameter estimate.
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out increasing its budget. We use the average CPM and calculate the additional
viewers that the firm may reach with these $2 million. This exercise suggest that
these cost savings correspond to the value of 400 ads reaching 80 million viewers (at
average CPM and average viewership).
Note that these efficiency gains from a merger are not due to economies of scale
or an improved bargaining position. Instead, the legacy discounts are associated with
the length of relationship of a firm in the broadcast market. The calculation presents
a lower bound to such cost savings as we do not allow the merged from to re-optimize
its advertising mix given the new prices. Despite its simplicity, the exercise shows the
potential for important efficiency gains in the market for television advertising.
8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the existence of input discounts in the market for national
television advertising. Importantly, industry practitioners assert these discounts are
independent of the size of the firm but instead are reliant upon the length of relation-
ship between the advertiser and television network. We first present a reduced-form
model that confirms the existence of discounts. Next, we use detailed data on firms’
input-sourcing decisions of where and how much to advertise in order to quantify
the size of the discounts. We find the discount attributed to legacy firms is 7.9%.
This suggest that a non-legacy firm will save, on average, $2 million on their current
advertising strategies if it is able to capture the legacy discount.
Such efficiencies in accessing an inputs market are historically hard to identify as
firms guard cost information closely. Still, firms largely refer to efficiency rationales
as a main justification of mergers. While efficiencies certainly exist, it is unclear
how they may affect firms’ decisions on entry as well as downstream market compe-
tition. Identifying these efficiencies is an important first step in understanding how







This section provides an explanation of how products are defined. We cover the al-
gorithm that is used (Affinity Propagation) and what specific data is used in the
clustering algorithm. We use a clustering algorithm called Affinity Propagation as a
means of grouping shows together. We chose Affinity Propagation because it endoge-
nously selects the number of clusters as well as determining a single point that best
represents the cluster, called an exemplar. The importance of these two properties
will be discussed further after the explanation of the algorithm.
2.A.1 The Algorithm
Call s(xi, xj) ‘similarity’ and define it as the negative euclidean distance between two
points.
s(xi, xj) = −
√
(xi1 − xj1)2 + (xi2 − xj2)2... (2.14)
Responsibility, r(i, j) is how well suited xi is to serve as an exemplar for xj
Availability, a(i, j) represents how appropriate it is for xi to pick xj as its exemplar
Algorithm
1. Compute s(i, j) for all data points
2. Set a(i, j) = 0 ∀i, j
3. Update responsibility and availability with the following rule until convergence:
∀i, j : r(i, j) = s(i, j)−maxj′:j′ 6=j[s(i, j′) + a(i, j′)] (2.15)
∀i, j : a(i, j) =
 (2.16)
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4. We then calculate clusters ci = argmaxj[a(i, j) + r(i, j)]
As each data point would like to pick itself as the best example of a cluster that
only contains a single data point, we must input a preference for each s(i, i) which
indicates how much each data point would like to be an exemplar. In our case we set
this preference to the 35th percentile of similarity across the data points.










e∗ = argmine∈eH(e) (2.19)
Where en ∈ [1, ..., N ] is the exemplar label which assigns each data point n to another
data point en. This is our net similarity, or the total similarity between all points
and exemplars given the preference of each point to be an exemplar.24
2.A.2 Application
For our application we take in demographics from the Rentrak data and normalize
each demographic. This makes it so every demographic put into the s(i, j) similarity




These normalizations take place within each conglomerate, treating the major
broadcast networks as their own conglomerates. We choose to normalize in this
way because it mimics how firms buy advertising in the upfront market. Firms buy
24A technical point left out of this equation ensures that every point is assigned to only one
exemplar and no cluster is allowed to exist without an exemplar.
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blocks of advertising based on the demographics they want to reach and negotiate
independently across networks.
2.A.3 List of demographics included in clustering algorithm
Below is a list of demographics used in clustering. As previously mentioned, demo-
graphics are measured at a household level and not the individual. This means if
a white household that makes $45000 a year consists of one Man who is 35, one
woman who is 39 and two female children ages 8 and 10, whenever a television is
on they would be included in 17 demographics (A,M,W 18-49,25-54,35-64, White,
$40000-$49999, Male Present in HH, Female Present in HH, Presence of Children
6-10, Presence of Children 3-10, Two Adults in HH, Two Children in HH). Because
data is aggregated we include 73 demographics in our clustering algorithm. Demo-
graphics are listed below where A stands for ALL, M stands for Male, and F stands
for Female.
A18-24, M18-24, W18-24, A18-34, M18-34, W18-34, A18-44, M18-44, W18-44,
A18-49, M18-49, W18-49, M21-24, W21-24, M21-34, W21-34, A25-34, M25-49, W25-
49, A25-54, M25-54, W25-54, A35-44, A35-64, M35-64, W35-64, A45-64, A55-64,
A50+, M50+, W50+, A65+, M65+, W65+, African American, Hispanic, Asian
American, White, Other (Race), $0-$19999, $20000-$29999, $30000-$39999, $40000-
$49999, $50000-$74999, $75000-$99999, $100000-$124999, $125000-$149999, $150000-
$174999, $175000-$199999, $200000-$249999, $75000+, $100000+, $125,000+, $150000+,
$200000+, $250000+, Single Person in HH (Male), Single Person in HH (Female),
Male Present in HH, Female Present in HH, Children Present in HH, No Children
Present in HH, Presence of Children 3-5 in HH, Presence of Children 3-10 in HH,
Presence of Children 6-10 in HH, Presence of Children 11-17 in HH, One Adult with
Children in HH, One Child in HH, Two Adults in HH, Two Children in HH, Three
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